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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
PlaintifCAppellee,
V.

CaseNo.20010817-CA

THOMAS SMITH,
Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996), where the defendant in a district court criminal action may take an
appeal to the Court of Appealsfromafinalorder for anything other than afirstdegree or
capital felony offense. In the underlying case related to this appeal, Appellant Thomas
Smith was convicted of two counts of tax evasion for the year 1995. The counts were
entered as separate second and third degree felony offenses, under Utah Code Ann. § 768-1101(1 )(b) and (c) (1995). A copy of the judgment is attached hereto as Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The Issues Presented by Standby Counsel:1

1 The trial court appointed Salt Lake Legal Defender Association ("LDA") to serve as
standby counsel for Thomas Smith, while he represented himself in the criminal
proceedings. (See infra, "Statement of the Case," herein.) LDA continues to represent
Smith in that capacity. See State v. Bakalov. 1999 UT 45,ffl[15,16, 979 P.2d 799 (an
accused may defend him- or herself in criminal proceedings, including on appeal); Myers
v. Johnson. 76 F.3d 1330,1333-34 (6th Cir. 1996) (recognizing a state criminal defendant's constitutional right to present pro se briefs and motions on appeal); see also State

1. Whether the trial court erred in failing to dismiss one of the counts in this case,
where the two counts merged and constituted a single offense under the law.
Standard of Review: The first issue concerns a question of statutory interpretation,
which this Court will review for correctness according no deference to the trial court.
See State v.Kepplen 1999 UT App 89, «f4, 976 P.2d 99 (citing State v. Brooks. 908 P.2d
856, 859 (Utah 1995)); State v. Yanez. 2002 UT App 50,1J11,42 P.3d 1248 ("Whether
two crimes merge is 'essentially an issue of statutory construction that we review for
correctness, according no particular deference to the trial court'").
v. Rudolph. 970 P.2d 1221 (Utah 1998). In that capacity, LDA has raised two issues on
appeal, which are identified as the issues and arguments of "Standby Counsel." Those
matters have been raised pursuant to LDA's obligation "to be an active advocate in behalf
[of] the client and [to] support the client's appeal to the best of its ability." See Order,
dated April 24,2002, attached hereto as Addendum B (hereinafter "April 24 Order").
Inasmuch as Appellant Smith also "wishes to raise issues that LDA" may not raise,
see April 24 Order, Smith has included his arguments in this brief. The matters presented
by Smith are identified as the issue and arguments of the "Pro-Se Defendant."
The manner in which LDA and Smith have proceeded with this brief in presenting
Smith's pro se issue and arguments satisfies the April 24 Order, and allows this Court "to
fully evaluate all of Appellant's issues on appeal in the most effective and efficient format." See April 24 Order. "It also comports with sound and fair procedure" and the rules
of procedure. See State v. Clavton. 639 P.2d 168,170 (Utah 1981); Utah R. App. P. 24.
While this Court has made reference in its April 24 Order to the "Anders" doctrine
as set forth in State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168, and Anders v. California. 386 U.S. 738
(1967), that doctrine is inapplicable here. According to the law, an Anders brief is
appropriate in cases where appointed counsel has concluded "that an indigent client's
criminal appeal is without merit." Clayton. 639 P.2d at 169; Anders. 386 U.S. at 744.
Standby counsel in Smith's case has not reached such a conclusion. Standby
counsel has not found the "case to be wholly frivolous, after a conscientious examination
of it." Clayton. 639 P.2d at 169; Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. Standby counsel does not
intend to seek "leave to withdraw from the appeal." And standby counsel does not intend
to seek a dismissal of the appeal as set forth in the Anders doctrine. Indeed, standby
counsel is raising issues on appeal for a determination on the merits.
2

2. Whether the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury on the defense of
"good-faith," as set forth in Cheek v. United States. 498 U.S. 192 (1991).
Standard of Review: This Court reviews a trial court's refusal to give a jury
instruction for correctness, providing no deference to the trial court's ruling. State v.
Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992). Also, in considering whether defendant was
entitled to have the jury instructed on his defense, this Court will view the evidence and
inferences that can be drawn from the evidence "in the light most favorable to the
defense." State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 532 (Utah 1983).
The Issue Presented by the Pro-Se Defendant (see supra, note 1, herein):
3. Whether the convictions can be sustained on insufficient evidence.
Standard of Review: This Court reviews a sufficiency issue as follows:
We reverse the jury's verdict in a criminal case when we conclude as a matter of
law that the evidence was insufficient to warrant conviction. State v. Harman, 767
P.2d 567, 568 (Utah App. 1989). Nevertheless, "the standard for reversal is high."
Id. We will reverse only if the evidence is so "'inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime.1" Id (quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443,444
(Utah 1983)); accord State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 876 (Utah 1985). We review
from a perspective most favorable to the verdict the evidence and all inferences
reasonably drawn from the evidence, recognizing that determinations regarding
witness credibility are solely within the jury's province. Harman, 767 P.2d at 568.
State v.Smith, 927 P.2d 649 (Utah App. 1996), cert denied, 937 P.2d 136 (Utah 1997).
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENTS
The Issues Raised by Standby Counsel (see supra, note 1, herein): The first issue
concerning application of the merger doctrine is preserved in the record on appeal at 5953

602 and 936:509-530. The second issue concerning the "good-faith" instruction is
preserved at 502 and 960:194-209.
The Issue Raised by the Pro-Se Defendant (see supra, note 1, herein). The sufficiency issue raised by the prose defendant is preserved in the record at 936:427-33.
RULES. STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following statutes will be determinative of the issues on appeal: Utah Code
Ann. §§ 76-8-1101 (1995); 59-10-502 (2000); and 76-1-402 (1999). The text of those
provisions is contained in the attached Addendum C.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case. Course of Proceedings. Disposition in the Court Below.
On October 12, 1999, the statefiledcharges against Smith under Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-8-1101 (1995) for two counts of tax evasion in 1995. (R. 1-2.)2 The trial court
appointed LDA to represent Smith in the matter. (See R. 15.) During trial court proceedings, Smith filed numerous documents on his own behalf. (See i.e. R. 18-21; 28-69.)
In September 2000, the trial court ruled that Smith could represent himself in the
proceedings and it appointed LDA to serve as standby counsel to Smith in the case. (R.
193-94; 214-283; 324; 408-412.)
On April 9, 2001, the trial court commenced a jury trial in the matter. (R. 490-91;
549-50; 553-54.) At the conclusion of the three-day trial, the jury found Smith guilty as

2 Since the charges in this case relate to tax filings for 1995, all references to Utah Code
Ann. § 76-8-1101 are to the 1995 version of the statute.
4

charged. (R. 589-92.) Thereafter, on September 7,2001, the trial judge sentenced
Smith to indeterminate prison terms for the offenses, then suspended the prison terms and
ordered Smith to serve probation for a period of 36 months. (R. 861-63.) Smith filed a
Notice of Appeal (R. 888-89). He is challenging the rulings of the lower court as they
relate to the trial proceedings.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The state charged Smith with tax crimes under Section 76-8-1101(l)(b) and (l)(c).
At trial, the state presented evidence that Smith lived in a mobile home park in Sandy,
Utah, in 1995. Smith workedfroman office in his mobile home. He provided research
services to citizens concerning the preparation of tax papers and filings. (See R. 934:6774; 935:129-30, 148, 151,183.)
The state also called witnesses to testifyfromZions Bank, the tax commission, and
the Internal Revenue Service. Those witnesses presented the following evidence.
The records custodian for Zions Bank testified that Smith and a partner signed
bank signature cards for two separate trust accounts: The Citizens Legal Library Trust
Account, and the Freedom of Information Act (F.O.I. A.) Trust Account. (R. 935:191-97,
201,213.) In addition, Smith signed a bank signature card as custodian for the account of
John Birrell. (R. 935:201.) The records custodian testified that deposits were made to the
accounts in 1995 and checks were written against the accounts. (See R. 935:207.)
Mericia Milligan, an auditor for the Utah State Tax Commission, testified that
Smith failed to file a tax return for 1995. (R. 935:222; see also R. 935:337-38 (testimony
5

of Deloris Furniss).) She also testified that Smithfiledreturns in the 1970's and the
1980fs. (R. 935:223.) Milligan described the relationship between federal and state tax
filings, and she testified that according to the state tax commission, a Utah resident is
required to file a state return if he is married, under the age of 65,filingjointly, and has
earned at least $10,300 in income for the year. (See R. 935:241-43, 338-339.)
Lori Campbell testified that she worked for the Internal Revenue Service in the
criminal investigations division. (R. 935:248-49.) Based on her investigation of bank
records relating to Smith, she determined that Smith received payment for services
rendered in 1995 (R. 935:251, 262), and he paid for personal expenses from the Zions
trust accounts. (R. 935:258.) Campbell testified that Smith did not file a federal tax
return for the year 1995. (R. 935:259.)
Dorothy Akins testified that she worked for the state tax commission as an investigator. (R. 935:275.) In that capacity, Akins researched records relating to Smith (id. at
276), and determined that in 1995 Smith was running a research business from his home,
he was paid for his services, and he deposited payments into either the F.O.I.A. Account,
the Citizens Legal Library Account, or the account for John Birrell. (Id. at 278-79,282.)
According to Akins, the deposits in 1995 to the three trust/bank; accounts totaled
$66,862.58. (Id. at 289, 307.) Akins calculated deductions, and subtracted other amounts
that could not be attributed to Smith, to arrive at an income for Smith for 1995 in the
amount of $45,308.65. (IdL at 289-294.) Akins also reviewed bankruptcy documents
filed by Smith, which reflected an income in 1995 of $10,500. (Id at 297-99.) Akins
6

testified that a person was required to file a tax return in 1995 if he was married, under
the age of 65, and earned more than $10,300. (R. 935:282-85.)
Next, Becky McKenzie testified. She worked in the auditing division of the Utah
State Tax Commission. Based on her research, McKenzie determined that Smith's
taxable income for 1995 was $45,308, and he owed $3,052.97 in taxes for that year. (R.
936:351,365-66.) McKenzie testified that Smith did not pay taxes for 1995. She also
testified that he was required to file a tax return. (R. 936:366-374.)
After the state presented its evidence, Smith testified. He stated that from 1993 to
1996 (R. 936:482) he read books and articles and amassed material to ascertain whether
he was required to file a tax return. (R. 936:442,445.) Smith's books were admitted into
evidence. (Id. at 452-53, Exhibit 23.) Smith also sought professional opinions and wrote
to the Utah State Tax Commission to ask whether he was required by law to file a return.
Smith testified that the tax commission did not respond to his inquiries. (R. 936:461-62.)
Smith admitted that prior to 1995, he appeared before various tribunals to present
his arguments on behalf of others, and in each instance, Smith's arguments were rejected.
According to Smith, in 1994, he appeared before the Honorable Dee Benson in the United
States District Court for the District of Utah and he presented arguments concerning tax
filings. The judge rejected his arguments, compelling Smith to further educate himself on
whether he was required to file a return. (R. 936:484-90, 507.)
Smith testified that he continued his research and relied on his research in good
faith. (R. 936:450.) Smith made his best efforts to educate himself on the subject of tax
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returns, and he "honestly endeavored" to ascertain the law that required him to file. (R.
936:475.) Smith testified that based on his good-faith efforts and studies, he was not able
to find any provision that required him tofilea return. (R. 936:450-51,467-75, 508.)
Smith denied that his decision was "willful" in the criminal sense; rather, Smith's
decision was willful in that it was an educated decision, supported by the literature he
read. (R. 936:507.) Smith did not dispute that he lastfileda return in 1987. (R. 936:505.)
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted Smith as charged. Additional facts
relating to the issues on appeal are set forth below.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Summary of the Arguments Raised by Standby Counsel (see supra, note 1, herein):
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 renders double convictions improper under the "merger" doctrine and the "single-criminal-episode" doctrine. In this case, Smith was charged with
and convicted of two offenses for tax evasion in 1995 under Utah Code Ann. § 76-81101(l)(b) and (l)(c) (1995). Those subsections proscribe essentially the same conduct
under the "merger" doctrine; and the conduct at issue supports a single-criminal episode.
The trial court in this case erred when it allowed the double convictions to stand. Pursuant to § 76-1-402, the court should have vacated one of the convictions against Smith.
Next, during trial, Smith requested that the trial judge instruct the jury on the goodfaith defense as set forth in Cheek v. U.S.. 498 U.S. 192 (1991). Pursuant to Cheek, the
government must establish "willful" conduct to support a conviction for tax evasion. The
Cheek Court defined "willful" as "a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal
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duty." Ld. at 200-01. The Cheek Court also ruled that if defendant presented evidence of
a good-faith belief that he did not have tofilea tax return, the evidence would support a
valid defense. According to the Court in Cheek, the defendant is entitled to have the jury
consider whether the evidence of good faith negates criminal willfulness.
Smith presented evidence in this case to support a good-faith belief under Cheek.
Smith was entitled to have his defense presented to the jury in an understandable way.
That is, the jury should have been properly instructed on the matter. See Hamilton. 827
P.2d at 238. In this case, the trial court rejected Smith's good-faith instruction. That was
error. This case should be reversed and remanded for a new trial, in order that Smith may
present his good-faith defense to the jury in an understandable way.
Summary of the Argument Raised by the Pro-Se Defendant (see supra, note 1,
herein): The evidence in this case was insufficient to support the convictions. Utah law
provides that a person required tofilea federal tax return must also file a state return. The
state failed to present evidence in this case to support that Smith was required to file a
federal tax return. Thus, the jury had an insufficient evidentiary basis to find that Smith
was required to file a state return. The state failed to establish an element of each offense.
On that basis, the convictions for tax evasion must be reversed.
ARGUMENTS PRESENTED BY STANDBY COUNSEL3
POINT I. A CONVICTION IN THIS CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN
VACATED UNDER SECTION 76-1-402,

3 See supra, note 1, herein.
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In the lower court, the state charged Smith with two counts of tax evasion for
1995. Smith was convicted on both counts. The state charged the offenses under Utah
Code Ann. § 76-8-1101(l)(b) and (l)(c) (1995). The question in this case is whether the
double convictions for tax evasion may be allowed to stand under the law.
To decide that issue, this Court will look to Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402. That
provision states in relevant part the following:
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act of a
defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be
punished in different ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be
punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence
under any such provision bars a prosecution under any other such provision.
*

*

*

(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged
but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense. An
offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to
establish the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to
commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1999); see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (1999); Utah
Const, art. I, § 12; U.S. Const, amend. V (double jeopardy provision).
Section 76-1-402(1) defines the "single-criminal-episode" doctrine. Smith has
referred to that doctrine by that name in the analysis below. See infra. Point I.A.2.
Section 76-1-402(3) defines the "merger" doctrine. Smith has referred to that rule
as either the "merger" doctrine or the "included-offense" doctrine. See infra. Point I.A.1.
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The doctrines identified at Section 76-1-402(1) and (3) are separate, but related.
Under the "merger" doctrine (subsection (3)), this Court will consider whether the
two crimes at issue "are fsuch that the greater cannot be committed without necessarily
having committed the lesser/" State v. Shaffer. 725 P.2d 1301, 1313 (Utah 1986) (quoting
State v.Baker. 671 P.2d 152,156 (Utah 1983); Statev.HilL 674 P.2d 96, 97 (Utah
1983)). That analysis requires the Court to look "to the statutory elements of the two
crimes" at issue to determine if they merge. Yanez, 2002 UT App 50,f21. If the two
crimes "stand in the relationship of greater and lesser offenses," defendant cannot be
convicted of or punished for both. Hill 674 P.2d at 97. Here, the analysis supports
merger. A conviction must be vacated as set forth at infra. Point LA. 1.
Next, under the "single-criminal-episode" doctrine at subsection (1), the state may
pursue only a single conviction against defendant when his conduct over a period of time
constitutes a single act. That is,"embezzlement over a period of time may be found to
constitute one continuous transaction." State v. KimbeL 620 P.2d 515, 518 (Utah 1980).
Under that doctrine, the evidence in Smith's case supports a single criminal episode. A
conviction must be vacated, as set forth at infra. Point I.A.2.
A. BOTH THE "MERGER" DOCTRINE AND THE "SINGLE-CRIMINALEPISODE" DOCTRINE APPLY HERE TO COMPEL THE ENTRY OF AN
ORDER VACATING A CONVICTION.
1. The Subsections at Issue Here Proscribe the Same Conduct. Supporting
Application of the Merger Doctrine.
In considering application of § 76-1-402(3), this Court will construe the plain
11

language of the criminal provisions at issue. HilL 674 P.2d at 97; State v. Redd, 1999 UT
108, f 11, 992 P.2d 986 (statutes are construed according to their plain language;
unambiguous language in the statute may not be interpreted to contradict its plain
meaning); see also State v. Burns. 2000 UT 56, T|25,4 P.3d 795 (this Court's "primary
goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the
plain language"); Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd.. 771 P.2d 1033,1038 (Utah 1989) ("the
best indication of legislative intent is the statute's plain language").
The criminal provisions at issue in this case are set forth at Utah Code Ann. § 768-1101(l)(b) and (l)(c) (1995). Those subsections state the following:
(b) Any person who, with intent to evade any tax or requirement of Title 59 or any
lawful requirement of the State Tax Commission, fails to make, render, sign, or
verify any return or to supply any information within the time required under this
title, or who makes, renders, signs, or verifies any false orfraudulentreturn or
statement, or who supplies any false orfraudulentinformation, is guilty of a third
degree felony, except that, notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, thefineis not less
than $1,000 nor more than $5,000.
(c) Any person who willfully attempts to evade or defeat any tax or the payment
thereof is, in addition to other penalties provided by law, guilty of a second degree
felony, except that, notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, thefineis not less than
$1,500 nor more than $25,000.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101 (1995).
The tax evasion offenses at issue here require proof of the same elements.
Specifically, the plain language of subsection (l)(b) requires proof that the
defendant (i) intended (ii) to evade any tax or lawful requirement (iii) by failing to make,
render, sign, or verify a return or information; or by making a false orfraudulentreturn;
or by supplying false orfraudulentinformation. Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101 (l)(b).
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Subsection (l)(c) requires proof that defendant (i) willfully attempted (ii) to evade
or defeat any tax or the payment thereof. It is logical that a willful attempted evasion
under subsection (l)(c) occurs when a defendant fails to make a proper return; or verifies
or supplies false information on a tax return as set forth in subsection (l)(b). See Utah
Code Ann. § 76-8-1101(l)(b), (l)(c) (1995). In that regard, the provisions proscribe the
same conduct. The separate elements for each offense are further discussed below.
(a) The Separate Elements for Subsections (l)(b) and (l)(c).
(i) The mens rea element of each offense.
The mens rea identified in subsection (l)(b) is "intent"; the mens rea identified in
subsection (l)(c) is "willfully attempts." Under Utah law, "intent" and "willfully" are
defined to mean the same thing:
A person engages in conduct:
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his
conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to
engage in the conduct or cause the result.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 (1999) (emphasis added). Thus, the intentional/willfiil mens
reas identified in subsections (l)(b) and(l)(c) are identical.
Next, under Utah law the term "attempts" in subsection (l)(c) would support a
classic "included-offense" relationship between the provisions. That is, an "includedoffense" exists if it "constitutes an attempf to commit a crime. Utah Code Ann. §76-1402(3)(b) (emphasis added). Under Utah law, "a person is guilty of an attempt to commit
a crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of
13

the offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission of
the offense." Utah Code Ann. §76-4-101(1) (1999); Utah Code § 76-4-302 (1999).
The first element of each subsection supports merger under § 76-1-402(3).
(ii) The second element of each offense: Defendant "evade[d]" a tax.
The second element for each subsection requires the state to prove that defendant
"evade[d]M a tax. Subsection (l)(b) makes it a crime "to evade any tax or requirement of
Title 59 or any lawfiil requirement of the State Tax Commission"; and subsection (l)(c)
makes it a crime "to evade or defeat any tax or the payment thereof." Utah Code Ann. §
76-8-1101. Black's Law Dictionary defines the term "evasion," as follows: "Tax evasion. The willful attempt to defeat or circumvent the tax law in order to illegally reduce
one's tax liability." Black's Law Dictionary 1474 (7th ed. 1999) (emphasis added); see
also Salem Citv v. Farnsworth. 753 P.2d 514, 515 (Utah App. 1988) (in constructing
statutory terms, this Court will look to the dictionary to give the terms their "plain and
ordinary meaning").4 Thus, to "evade" means to "defeat." Subsections (l)(b) and (l)(c)

4 When the Court construes a statute according to its "plain language" and defines terms
in accordance with the dictionary, the Court ensures fundamental fairness in statutory
interpretation and application. If the state could obtain a conviction based on its own
creative interpretation of a statute, that would violate the due process provisions of the
state and federal constitutions. See State v. Blowers, 717 P.2d 1321 (Utah 1986); U.S.
Const, amend. XIV, § 1; Gravned v. Citv of Rockford. 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (laws
that fail to clearly proscribe criminal conduct are vague, and they keep persons from
knowing what is prohibited); see also Kolender v. Lawson. 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
This Court will construe the criminal statute at issue to avoid any unconstitutional
interpretation.
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proscribe the same conduct.
Next, both provisions make it unlawful to evade "any tax." Utah Code Ann. § 768-1101(1 )(b) and (l)(c). Under subsection (l)(c), it is also unlawful to evade any "payment thereof; and under subsection (l)(b) it is unlawful to evade any "requirement of
Title 59 or any lawful requirement of the State Tax Commission."
Closer review of the terms identified above in subsections (l)(b) and (l)(c),
reflects no real distinction in application. That is, subsection (l)(b) makes it unlawful to
evade any "requirement of Title 59," which requires the payment of taxes. See Utah
Code Ann. § 59-10-104 (1992 & 2000). Thus, subsection (l)(b) makes it unlawful to
evade payment That language exists in subsection (l)(c). In the end, subsections (l)(b)
and (l)(c) are identical, where they both proscribe the evasion of "any tax" or "payment."
That supports merger. In addition, as further set forth below, both subsections apply in
the same way to the facts of this case, without distinction. See infra. Point I.A.2.
(Hi) Subsection (l)(b) describes the manner in which the flintent to evade" may be
accomplished.
Finally, Subsection (l)(b) includes language that does not appear in subsection
(l)(c). It defines the circumstances that constitute an evasion, for example, where the
person has failed "to make, render, sign or verify any return or to supply any information
within the time required under this title," or where the person has supplied "false or
fraudulent information." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101(l)(b). At first glance, the
provision may appear to be distinguishable from subsection (l)(c). That is not the case.
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Where subsection (l)(c) simply proscribes general tax evasion, subsection (l)(b) covers
those situations where a person may accomplish such an evasion.
Stated another way, subsection (l)(c) does not attempt to limit how a willful
evasion may be accomplished. Consequently, its general language is as broad as
subsection (l)(b), which identifies each situation where an evasion may occur.
Consider the following: a person who fails to file an income tax return for the purpose of evading payment (passive evasion) may be prosecuted under the plain language
of either subsection (l)(b) or subsection (l)(c). Subsection (l)(b) makes it unlawful to
evade a tax by failing to make, sign or render a return, or by failing to supply information;
and subsection (l)(c) makes it unlawful to evade a tax or payment. Likewise, a person
who "makes, renders, signs or verifies" afraudulent/falsereturn, or who provides
false/fraudulent information to avoid a tax (affirmative evasion) may be charged under
either provision, since both provisions penalize tax evasion.
In reality, it is difficult to conceive of a situation where the state would be able to
prove an "attempted willful evasion" under subsection (l)(c) without evidence that
defendant failed to make, render, sign or verify a return; failed to supply information; or
filed false/fraudulent information as set forth in subsection (l)(b). Thus, in the end, the
subsections require the same proof for an attempted willful or intentional tax evasion.5
5 Subsection (l)(c) also states that any person who evades a tax, is guilty of a second
degree felony offense "in addition to other penalties provided by law" Utah Code Ann. §
76-8-1101(l)(c)(emphasis added). The emphasized language relates to civil "penalties"
imposed under Title 59. See Utah Code Ann.§ 59-1-401 and id at -401(9) (2000) (iden16

(b) The Utah Provisions Were Enacted to Conform to the Federal Provisions,
Which Prohibit Double Convictions.
The legislature intended the Utah tax laws to conform to the federal laws:
The intent of the Legislature in the enactment of this chapter [individual income
tax act] is to accomplish the following objectives:
(1) to impose on each resident individual, estate, or trust for each taxable year a tax
measured by the amount of his "taxable income" for such year, as determined for
federal income tax purposes, subject to certain adjustments; and
*

*

*

(3) to adopt for Utah individual income tax purposes, by reference, the provisions
of the federal income tax laws which are applicable in arriving at the amount of
income subject to tax for federal income tax purposes which, it is believed, will:
(a) promote consistency in tax treatment of persons required to file returns of
income for both federal individual income tax and Utah individual income tax
purposes; and
(b) enable a taxpayer to prepare his required Utah income tax return for any
taxable year with a minimum expenditure of additional time and effort after having
prepared his federal income tax return for such year;
(4) to conform, to the extent practicable, certain of the existing rules of procedure
under and for the administration of the Utah individual income tax law to
corresponding or apposite rules of administration and procedure prescribed by the
federal income tax laws, with a view to reduction of duplication of effort,
promotion of better understanding of requirements, and greater consistency
between state and federal procedures and administration.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-102 (2000).
The Utah criminal provisions are nearly identical to the federal provisions. Pursutifying civil "penalties," as separate from "criminal penalties"). It does not permit
additional "criminal penalties."
Indeed, that provision should not be construed to permit double convictions for the
same conduct, since such an interpretation would violate the double jeopardy provisions
of the state and federal constitutions. See Utah Const, art. I, § 12; U.S. Const, amend. V.
"The language 'in addition to other penalties provided by law' contained in [one
provision (but not in the other provision)] does not rise to the level of clear authorization
for multiple punishments." U.S. v. Kaiser, 893 F.2d 1300,1304 (11th Cir. 1990)
(emphasis added).
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ant to 26 U.S.C. § 7201, any person who "willfully attempts in any mainner to evade or
defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof1 is guilty of a felony under
federal law. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101(l)(c). Pursuant to 26 U.S. C. § 7203,
any person required to pay a federal tax or to make a federal return, who willfully "fails to
pay such estimated tax or tax, make such return, keep such records, or supply such
information, at the time or times required by law or regulations, shall, in addition to other
penalties provided by law, be guilty of a misdemeanor." Compare Utah Code Ann. § 768-1101(l)(b)(1995).6
Under the federal provisions, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit has ruled that the government may not obtain a conviction against a defendant
under both Sections 7201 and 7203 for defendant's failure tofilea return and to pay taxes
in the same year. In United States v. Newman, 468 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1972), cert,
denied, 411 U.S. 905 (1973), "[defendant was indicted for violating 26 U.S.C.A. § 7201
(a felony-willful attempt to evade income tax liability) and 26 U.S.C.A. § 7203 (a
misdemeanor-willful failure to file a tax return) and charged with eight separate counts,
6 The federal courts have interpreted 26 U.S.C. § 7201 to require proof of the following
elements: "willfulness, the existence of a tax deficiency, and an affirmative act
constituting an evasion or attempted evasion of the tax." The federal courts have
interpreted 26 U.S.C. § 7203 to require proof of "willfulness and failure to make a return
when due." See U.S. v. Dovle. 956 F.2d 73, 74 (5th Cir. 1992). Federal courts
interpreting the relevant provisions have ruled that § 7201, which penalizes affirmative
conduct, is a greater offense, while § 7201, which penalizes passive conduct, is a lesserincluded offense. Consequently, the government is prohibited from obtaining a conviction under both §§ 7201 and 7203 against defendant for the sametaxyear. See U.S. v.
Buckley. 586 F.2d 498, 504-05 (5th Cir. 1978), cert denied. 440 U.S. 982 (1979).
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one for each section for each of the years from 1967 through 1970." Id. at 793.
At trial, the government presented evidence to support that defendant failed to file
a return and he had income for the relevant years. The jury found defendant guilty on all
charges relating to 1968-1970, and acquitted him on the charges for 1967. Id. at 793.
On appeal, the defendant claimed he should not have been convicted of two counts
for each tax year. The government agreed:
Defendant's final contention, that imposition of consecutive sentences for the two
charges was improper, is conceded by the government in its brief, and we agree
that the trial court erred in this respect. Where a defendant's conduct violates two
separate statutes, it is improper to impose sentences under both statutes where one
offense (here, § 7203, the misdemeanor) is, in effect, a lesser included offense of
the other (here § 7201, the felony). See United States v. Rosenthal, 2 Cir. 1972,
454 F. 2d 1252,1255. It is clear that "Congress did not intend two punishments for
the same crime" id. We therefore vacate the three six-month sentences and the
convictions for violation of § 7203, the misdemeanor counts. Since it would be
improper for the trial court to now undertake modification of the felony counts, see
Kennedy v. United States, 9 Cir. 1964, 330 F.2d 26; United States v. Adams, 6 Cir.
1966, 362 F.2d 210; see also Chandler v. United States, 5 Cir., 468 F.2d 834,
1972, it is unnecessary for us to remand the case to the trial court. The judgment is
therefore modified by vacating the convictions and sentences on the three § 7203
counts and, as so modified, is affirmed.
Newman. 468 F.2d at 796; see also Buckley. 586 F.2d at 504-05 (defendant's convictions
for both tax evasion and failure tofilein each given year constituted double convictions
in violation of the law; court vacated a conviction relating to each year).
In U.S. v. Dovle. 956 F.2d 73, the Fifth Circuit ruled that Sections 7201 and 7203
are in a relationship of "included" offenses. Id at 74. Thus, in the defendant's case for a
violation of Section 7201, he was entitled to have the jury instructed on the lesser-
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included offense set forth at § 7203, as an alternative basis for the conviction. Id at 76.
In U.S. v. Kaiser. 893 F.2d 1300 (11th Cir. 1990), defendant was charged with and
convicted of two counts of tax evasion for each year that he filed a false return. Counts
one and two of the indictment alleged violations of 26 U.S.C. § 7201 for willful attempt
to evade and defeat a tax for the years 1979 and 1980; and counts three and four alleged
violations of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) forfilingfalse returns in 1979 and 1980. Id at 1301.
For each year in issue, the government obtained a conviction for filing a false return and
failing to pay taxes due. On appeal, the defendant claimed the two convictions per year
violated his rights under the double jeopardy clause. The United States Court of Appeal
for the Eleventh Circuit agreed. Id at 1306-07.
It ruled that the "tax evasion" under Section 7201 for each year was accomplished
"solely by means offilinga false return under oath" in violation of Section 7206(1). Id.
1306; see also id. at 1306-07 (citing "other circuits" that have considered the relationship
between §§ 7201 & 7203 and concluded the same). The court vacated one conviction for
each year. Id 1307; see also U.S. v. Snvder. 766 F.2d 167, 171 (4th Cir. 1985)
(defendant may not be convicted of tax evasion and failure to file for same year).
Inasmuch as the Utah provisions are similar to the federal provisions, they should
be construed in the same fashion. A comparison of the Utah statutory elements at issue in
this case supports that the state charged Smith twice for the same conduct and obtained a
double conviction. Here, the state alleged that Smith evaded a tax by failing to make a
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tax return. Both subsections (l)(b) and (l)(c) proscribe the same conduct and rely on the
same proof. Indeed, since the same act of evading taxes is necessary to both charges,
they merge. Also, as set forth in the federal analysis, the provisions may be construed to
stand in an included-offense relationship.
The "merger" doctrine applies in this case. Pursuant to Section 76-1-402(3), Smith
respectfully requests that this Court vacate a conviction.
2. The Evidence in this Case Reflects a "Single Criminal Episode."
Under Section 76-1-402(1), a single-criminal episode is defined as "all conduct
which is closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a
single criminal objective." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (1999). In considering application
of the single-criminal-episode doctrine, the Utah Supreme Court has stated the following:
. . . [T]he general test as to whether there are separate offenses or one offense is
whether the evidence discloses one general intent or discloses separate and distinct
intents. The particular facts and circumstances of each case determine this
question. If there is but one intention, one general impulse, and one plan, even
though there is a series of transactions, there is but one offense
Kimbel. 620 P.2d at 518 (quoting People v. Howes, 222 P.2d 969 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950));
see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (1999); State v. Crosby. 927 P.2d 638,645 (Utah
1996) (quoting KimbeL 620 P.2d at 518).
In State v. Crosby. 927 P.2d 638, the state charged defendant with three counts of
theft, alleging that "between November of 1991 and June of 1992, Crosby
misappropriated company funds for her personal use." Id. at 640. Defendant was
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convicted on the counts as charged, and she appealed. The supreme court ruled that the
trial court erred in permitting the three convictions for theft. According to the court,
"[t]he evidence in this case demonstrates that although the transactions underlying
Crosby's theft convictions occurred over a period of time, they were part of a single plan
and should have been charged as a single offense." Id at 645. The court remanded the
matter and ordered the trial court to consolidate the convictions into one. Id. at 646.
In considering application of § 76-1-402(1) here, this Court will assess whether the
conduct in this case was closely related in time and whether such conduct was "incident
to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective" to support a single
offense. State v. Keppler. 1999 UT App 89, Tf5, 976 P.2d 99 (cite omitted); see ateo State
v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 391 n. 14 (Utah App. 1997) (recognizing that under the
"single-criminal-episode" doctrine, the court will consider whether conduct at issue was
related in time and whether evidence supported a single criminal objective).
To that end, the evidence here reflects that while Smith failed tofilea return and to
pay taxes, the conduct in this case was a result of a single objective or a single event.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-402(1); 76-1-401.
Specifically, in this case, the timing factor was met. According to tax law, Smith
was required to file a state return and to pay taxes on or before a specific date. He failed
to do so. His failure to comply with the law by the due date supports the timing factor
under the single-criminal-episode doctrine.
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Next, the evidence in this case reflects one general plan. See Kimbel. 620 P.2d at
518. According to the state's evidence, Smith evaded payment in 1995 by failing tofilea
return. Although the state charged the conduct under two separate provisions (§ 76-81101(1 )(b) and (l)(c)), as set forth above, those provisions define the same crime and rely
on the same proof. Both required proof of intentional/willful conduct and both required
proof that defendant evaded a tax. See supra. Point LA. 1. Under either provision,
evading a tax could be accomplished by failing to file a return, orfilinga fraudulent
return, among other things. In this case, Smith allegedly evaded the tax by failing tofilea
return. Smith's alleged conduct supported a single plan that should have been charged as
a single offense. Pursuant to Utah law, the trial court erred when it refused to vacate one
of the convictions in this case.
B. A CONVICTION MUST BE VACATED.
When a defendant has been wrongly convicted of two offenses - arisingfroma
single-criminal episode or under the merger doctrine — a conviction must be vacated.
Shaffer. 725 P.2d at 1313-15 (court vacated a conviction); Ml, 674 P.2d at 96-98 (where
defendant was wrongly convicted of aggravated robbery and theft, court vacated
conviction); (R. 595-602 (defense requested that trial court vacate conviction)).
A violation of § 76-1-402 generally warrants the entry of an order vacating the
conviction for the lesser offense. In the context of this case, it would be appropriate for
the Court to vacate the conviction for the second degree felony offense, attempted willful
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evasion, for two reasons. First, this Court may apply the remedy that it deems appropriate.
See State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201,1209-1211 (Utah 1993) (court recognizes that in
fashioning remedy, it may modify judgment as it deems appropriate); see also State v.
Powasnik. 918 P.2d 146, 150 n. 2 (Utah App. 1996); Utah R. App. P. 30(b) (2000).
To that end, this Court may apply the maxim that the more specific statute controls
over the more general statute. See State v. Lowder. 889 P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 1994); State
v. Vigil. 842 P.2d 843, 845 (Utah 1992). Here, subsection (l)(b) (intentional evasion) is
more specific and appropriate than subsection (l)(c) (attempted willful evasion). Also,
the evidence before the jury supported that Smith was passive in his conduct, where he
failed to file a return. He did not take affirmative steps to evade taxes. See supra, note 6.
Subsection (l)(b) more accurately describes and proscribes the conduct at issue here. On
that basis, the conviction under subsection (l)(c) should be vacated.
Second, under Utah law, "where there is doubt or uncertainty as to which of two
punishments is applicable to an offense," the accused "is entitled to the benefit of the
lesser." State v. Shondel. 453 P.2d 146,148 (Utah 1969); see also Utah Code Ann. § 7717-1 (1999) ("When it appears the defendant has committed a public offense and there is
reasonable doubt as to which of two or more degrees he is guilty, he shall be convicted
only of the lower degree"). Here, the attempted willful evasion charge carries a penalty
of one to fifteen years. The intentional evasion charge carries a penalty of zero to five
years. The more severe second degree penalty for attempted willful evasion should be
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vacated. Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-1.
For the reasons set forth above, and pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) and
(3), Smith respectfully requests the entry of an order vacating a conviction.
POINT II. SMITH WAS ENTITLED TO AN INSTRUCTION ON HIS
GOOD-FAITH BELIEF.
A. UTAH LAW ENTITLES A DEFENDANT TO PRESENT HIS THEORY OR
DEFENSE IN THE FORM OF AN INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY.
A defendant has the right to have his "theory of the case presented to the jury in a
clear and understandable way." State v. Potter. 627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utah 1981); see also
State v. Smith. 706 P.2d 1052,1058 (Utah 1985); Jorgensen v. Issa. 739 P.2d 80, 82
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232,238 (Utah 1995) (trial court has
duty to instruct jury on the law applicable to the case) (quoting Potter. 627 P.2d at 78);
State v. Garcia. 2001 UT App 19, J8,18 P.3d 1123. That right comports with fundamental fairness. Potter. 627 P.2d at 78 (defendant was denied a fair trial "on the critical
issues of the case" where the instructions could have misled and confused the jury).
Where a defendant has requested proper instructions as they relate to his theory of
the case, "[fjailure to give requested instructions is reversible error if it tends to mislead
the jury to the prejudice of the complaining party or insufficiently or erroneously advises
the jury on the law." Jorgensen. 739 P.2d at 82 (citing InreEstateofKesler. 702 P.2d 86,
96 (Utah 1985)). In this case, the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to
instruct the jury on Smith's "good-faith" defense.
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B. UNDER THE TAX LAWS. A DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO CLAIM IN
HIS DEFENSE THAT HE BELIEVED IN "GOOD FAITH" THAT THE TAX
LAWS WERE NOT APPLICABLE TO HIM. THEREBY NEGATING
CRIMINAL INTENT.
The Utah tax statutes were enacted to conform to the federal statutes. See Utah
Code Ann. § 59-10-102(4) (2000). Indeed, subsections 76-8-1101(l)(b) and (c) of the
Utah Code are nearly identical to 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 7201, 7203. Both the state and federal
provisions make it unlawful for a person to intentionally/willfully evade a tax. Compare
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101(l)(b),(c); with 26 U.S.C. A. §§ 7201 and 7203: see supra.
Point I.
In construing the federal tax provisions, the U.S. Supreme Court has specified that
the government must prove specific intent to support a willful tax evasion. See Cheek v.
U.S.. 498 U.S. 192,194,200-01 (1991). A copy of the Cheek decision is attached as
Addendum D. Congress incorporated a specific intent element into the provisions in
order that a person would not be held criminally liable for a "bona fide misunderstanding"
of the law. IcL at 200 (quoting United States v. Murdock. 290 U.S. 389,226 (1933)).
Thus, for a "willful" or "intentional" tax evasion, the government must prove "that
the law imposed a duty on the defendant, that the defendant knew of this duty, and that he
voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty." Cheek. 498 U.S. at 201: see also U.S. v.
Barnett. 945 F.2d 1296,1298 (5th Cir. 1991) ("The Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that the defendant charged with willful failure to file a tax return must have willfully
failed to file knowing that he had a legal duty to do so"), cert, denied. 503 U.S. 941
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(1992) (citing CheeL 498 U.S. at 200; U.S. v. Pomponio. 429 U.S. 10 (1976); U.S. v.
Bishop 412 U.S. 346 (1973)).
The Court in Cheek also recognized the "good-faith" belief defense. By way of
explanation, in Cheek the government charged defendant with multiple counts of income
tax evasion for the years 1980, 1981, and 1983 through 1986.7 Cheek, 498 U.S. at 194.
Cheek represented himself at trial and testified in his defense. He admitted that he
had not filed personal income tax returns during the years in question. He
testified that as early as 1978, he had begun attending seminars sponsored by, and
following the advice of, a group that believes, among other things, that the federal
tax system is unconstitutional. Some of the speakers at these meetings were
lawyers who purported to give professional opinions about the invalidity of the
federal income tax laws. Cheek produced a letter from an attorney stating that the
Sixteenth Amendment did not authorize a tax on wages and salaries but only on
gain or profit. Petitioner's defense was that, based on the indoctrination he received
from this group and from his own study, he sincerely believed that the tax laws
were being unconstitutionally enforced and that his actions during the 1980-1986
period were lawful. He therefore argued that he had acted without the willfulness
required for conviction of the various offenses with which he was charged.
Cheek, 498 U.S. at 195-96.
At the conclusion of trial, the judge in Cheek instructed the jury that "an
objectively reasonable good-faith misunderstanding of the law would negate willfulness,

7 In Cheek, the defendant did not ask the Court to apply the merger doctrine or any variation on that doctrine to the multiple charges filed against him for each tax year. See
Cheek. 498 U.S. at 193-94. Therefore, the Court in Cheek did not address the multiple
charges. Cheek cannot be construed to govern the issues raised in Smith's Point I, supra.
See Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087,1090 (Utah 1989) (where there is
"no analysis" on a point of law in a cited case, this Court will not consider the cited case
to govern the matter; the case will have "little persuasive effect" and will not constitute
authority on the matter); see State v. Ostler. 2001 UT 68, %6 n.2, 31 P.3d 528 (rejecting
case law that is not dispositive of the issue).
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but mere disagreement with the law would not." Id. at 196. Also, "'[a]n honest but
unreasonable belief is not a defense and does not negate willfulness,'" and "['a]dvice or
research resulting in the conclusion that wages of a privately employed person are not
income or that the tax laws are unconstitutional is not objectively reasonable and cannot
serve as the basis for a good faith misunderstanding of the law defense,'" Id. at 197.
The jury convicted Cheek on all counts, and he appealed. The United States
Supreme Court ultimately reviewed the matter, and ruled that the trial judge improperly
instructed the jury on the good-faith defense. Id at 201. According to the Court, a "goodfaith" misunderstanding of the law is a defense in a prosecution for tax crimes.
The United States Supreme Court began its analysis of the "good-faith" defense by
recognizing that ignorance of the law generally "is no defense to [a] criminal
prosecution." Cheek. 498 U.S. at 199. However, in a case where the government is
required to prove specific intent or willfulness, ignorance will negate intent.
[I]f the Government proves actual knowledge of the pertinent legal duty, the
prosecution, without more, has satisfied the knowledge component of the
willfulness requirement. But carrying this burden requires negating a defendant's
claim of ignorance of the law or a claim that because of a misunderstanding of the
law, he had a good-faith belief that he was not violating any of the provisions of
the tax laws.
Cheek, 498 U.S. at 202.
In the end, the issue is whether, based on all the evidence, the Government has
proved that the defendant was aware of the duty at issue, which cannot be true if
the jury credits a good-faith misunderstanding and belief submission, whether or
not the claimed belief or misunderstanding is objectively reasonable.
Id. at 202.
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Under the United States Supreme Court analysis, evidence of a good-faith belief
did not have to be "objectively reasonable" to negate criminal willfulness. Id at 203.
Also, if the jury believed Cheek's evidence of a good-faith belief, "the Government
would not have carried its burden to prove willfulness, however unreasonable a court
might deem such a belief." Id. at 202.
The Supreme Court recognized that even though the jury was at liberty to discredit
the defendant's claims andfindthat defendant was "aware of his duty to file a return," id.
at 202, the matter remained an issue for the jury. Indeed, "[knowledge and belief are
characteristically questions for the factfinder, in this case the jury." Id. at 203. Forbidding the jury to consider the defendant's "evidence that might negate willfulness would
raise a serious question under the Sixth Amendment's jury trial provisions." Id. at 203.
In the end, the United States Supreme Court found reversible error, where the trial
court improperly "instruct[ed] the jury to disregard evidence of Cheek's understanding
that, within the meaning of the tax laws, he was not a person required to file a return or to
pay income taxes and that wages are not taxable income, as incredible as such
misunderstandings of and beliefs about the law might be." Id. at 203.8 The case was
8 The Supreme Court ruled that in his defense, the defendant was entitled to present
evidence that he believed in good-faith that the tax laws did not relate to "income" and
"wages." However, the defendant was not entitled to have the jury consider his "belief1
that the tax laws were unconstitutional. Cheek, 498 U.S. at 206-07. The Court considered
the latter views to be irrelevant. Id Also, the Supreme Court ruled that defendant was
not entitled to an acquittal as a matter of law as a result of his "good-faith" beliefs. See
id at 204-207. He was entitled only to have the jury consider his defense.
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remanded for further proceedings. Id at 207.
In sum, Cheek supports the following: [1] The government must prove specific
intent to support a conviction under the tax evasion statutes. Cheek, 498 U.S. at 200. [2]
Although mistake of law generally is not a defense, id. at 199, a defendant's misunderstanding of the law constitutes a "good-faith" defense in a criminal tax case where the
government must prove specific intent to support the conviction. Id. at 202-03. [3] The
defendant's "good-faith" belief does not have to be reasonable; that is, an honest but unreasonable belief constitutes a valid defense. Id at 203. [4] When a defendant presents
evidence of his good-faith belief, the government must present evidence to negate that
belief beyond a reasonable doubt. Id at 202,203. [5] And when the defendant presents
evidence of his good-faith belief, he is entitled to have the jury properly instructed on the
matter. Bamett, 945 F.2d at 1298.
C. THE "GOOD-FAITH" BELIEF DEFENSE IS APPLICABLE HERE.
When the Utah legislature enacted the state tax provisions, it intended to conform
the Utah provisions to the federal law in order to promote consistency, and to promote a
better understanding as to what is required under the laws. Utah Code Ann. § 59-10102(4) (2000).
The Utah legislature also enacted criminal tax provisions similar to the federal
provisions. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101(l)(b), (c); 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201, 7203;
see supra. Point I, herein. Where Utah law is modeled after federal law, Utah appellate
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courts will look to federal law to aid in interpreting the Utah provisions. State v. Gray.
717 P.2d 1313,1317 (Utah 1986); PowasniL 918 P.2d at 149; State v. Chavez. 840 P.2d
846, 848 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert denied. 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). To that end,
this Court shouldfindthat when the legislature enacted § 76-8-1101, it intended to
incorporate the definition for "intent" and "willful" that is found in federal tax law.
That is, as set forth in Cheek, the government must prove specific intent under the
Utah criminal tax provisions: "Willfulness, as construed by our prior decisions in criminal
tax cases, requires the Government to prove that the law imposed a duty on the defendant,
that the defendant knew of this duty, and that he voluntarily and intentionally violated that
duty." Cheek, 498 U.S. at 201; see also kL at 200 (Supreme Court first articulated the
specific intent showing for tax cases in 1933).
If this Court interprets Section 76-8-1101(l)(b) and (l)(c) to require proof of
specific intent as set forth in Cheek, such an interpretation will comport with the intent of
the legislature as set forth in § 59-10-102(4) (legislature intended Utah tax laws to
conform to federal law), and it will ensure that Utah tax laws are consistent with the
federal provisions in administration and application. Such an interpretation also will
support application of the "good-faith" defense under Utah law, as further set forth below.
1. Where the Government Must Prove Specific Intent to Support a Conviction
Under Utah Law for Tax Evasion, the Defendant Is Entitled to Present the GoodFaith Defense.
Utah law is consistent with Cheek in that "ignorance of the law or a mistake of
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law" generally is not a defense to a criminal prosecution. Cheek. 498 U.S. at 199; Utah
Code Ann. § 76-2-304(2) (1995). Indeed, under Utah statutory law, ignorance or mistake
of law is a defense when it is due to defendant's reasonable belief that his conduct did not
constitute a crime, and the defendant relied upon an official interpretation of the law
made by an agency that is responsible for interpreting the law. Id. § 76-2-304 (2)(b).9
In addition, Utah law is consistent with Cheek in that mistake of law is a defense
in a case where the government is required to prove specific intent to support a conviction. In that instance, the defendant is not required to make the showing set forth at § 762-304(2)(b). The defendant simply may present testimony that he misunderstood the law.
In State v. Granato. 610 P.2d 1290 (Utah 1980), the defendant, who represented a
liquor distillery, made a political contribution to Scott Matheson's campaign for
governor. Id. at 1291. Utah law in effect at the time made it illegal for a distiller of
intoxicating liquors to make such contributions. Id. at 1291 n.l & 1293 (citing Utah Code
Ann. § 32-4-22 (1979 Supp.)). A violation of § 32-4-22 constituted a third degree felony.
Although Mr. Matheson declined the contribution, the state prosecuted defendant
for an attempt to commit the offense. At trial, the defendant claimed, and the state
stipulated, that defendant "had no knowledge of the existence of the statute in question,
nor of any legal prohibition against making campaign contributions." Id at 1291-92.
That is, defendant was ignorant of the law. At the conclusion of trial, the judge found
9 Under Utah law, a mistake of fact is a defense to a criminal prosecution. Utah Code
Ann. §76-2-304(1) (1995).
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defendant guilty. IdL
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that in order to sustain a conviction for
the offense, the state was required to prove that defendant had specific intent, or "guilty
knowledge" that he was violating the statute. Id. at 1292. In that regard, an "inference of
guilty knowledge" would not suffice to sustain the conviction. Id The supreme court
further ruled that on the facts of the case, the state could not establish a crime. Indeed,
since the state stipulated "that the defendant had no knowledge of the prohibitory statute,"
that evidence "expressly negatived" any inference of criminal intent. Id. Under Granato,
a misunderstanding of the law served as a defense to a specific-intent crime.
The rule in Granato is consistent with Cheek, where the defendant may present
evidence that he misunderstood the law, as a defense to a specific-intent crime.
Next, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled that a subjective "mistake" will serve as a
defense to a criminal prosecution. See State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1158 (Utah
1991) ("subjective mistake" by the defendant as to the presence of an "aggravating
circumstance" would be a defense to a charge of attempted aggravated murder); State v.
Elton. 680 P.2d 727, 730 (Utah 1984) (in considering Section 76-2-304, "ignorance or
mistake" bears on the subjective state of mind of the defendant).
Also, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized that a person may present a "goodfaith" belief defense in a civil tax proceeding. Such a defense may be based on an
"arguable point of law." Hales Sand & Gravel Inc. v. Audit Division of the Utah State
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Tax Commission, 842 P.2d 887, 895 (Utah 1992) ("the taxpayer can escape the [tax]
penalty if he or she can show that he or she based the nonpayment of taxes on a
legitimate, good faith interpretation of an arguable point of law"); Chicago Bridge & Iron
Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 839 P.2d 303, 309 (Utah 1992).
In several respects, Utah law is consistent with Cheek. Thus, the good-faith
defense in Cheek applies to a prosecution under Section 76-8-1101(l)(b), (l)(c) (1995).
In sum, Utah law and Cheek are consistent as follows:
[1] The Utah legislature intended the state tax provisions to comport with the
federal provisions, and the Utah tax crimes are nearly identical to the federal crimes. This
Court will look to federal law to interpret the Utah provisions. To that end, the government must prove specific intent to support a conviction under the Utah provisions.10
[2] While a "mistake of law" generally is not a defense, under Utah law a
defendant's misunderstanding of the law constitutes a defense in a criminal case where
the government must prove specific intent to support the conviction.11
[3] Under Utah law, a defendant's good-faith belief does not have to be

10 See Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-102 (legislature intended Utah tax law to conform to
federal law); Gray. 717 P.2d at 1317 (where state law is modeled after federal law, court
will look to federal interpretations); Cheek. 498 U.S. at 200 (federal tax law requires
proof of specific intent io support criminal conviction).
11 See Cheek. 498 U.S. at 199,202-03 (while mistake of law is generally not a defense,
it exists where the government is required to prove specific intent); Utah Code Ann. § 762-304(2) (mistake of law is generally not a defense); Granato, 610 P.2d 1290 (ignorance
of law is a defense where government is required to prove "guilty knowledge").
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reasonable; that is, an honest but unreasonable belief constitutes a valid defense.12
[4] A good-faith belief may be based on an "arguable point of law."13
[5] A good-faith belief negates specific intent. When the defendant presents
evidence that negates a criminal mental state, it remains with the government to persuade
the jury beyond a reasonable doubt as to each element of the crime. That means, the state
has the burden to disprove the affirmative defense.14
[6] When the defendant presents evidence of his theory of the case, he is entitled to
have the jury properly instructed on the matter.15
In the end, the good-faith defense applies under Utah law in a case for tax evasion.
2. The Federal and State Tax Provisions Overlap, Entitling a Defendant to the
Good-Faith Defense in State Proceedings.
The "good-faith" defense set forth in Cheek is available under Utah law for
additional reasons. Specifically, under the Utah criminal tax provisions, the state must
show that defendant was required tofilea correct tax return, but failed to do so. See Utah
12 See Cheek, 498 U.S. at 203; Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1158 (a subjective mistake is a
defense); Elton, 680 P.2d at 730 (considering subjective state of mind of the defendant).
13 See CheeL 498 U.S. at 200-03; Hales Sand, 842 P.2d at 895 (a taxpayer will escape
liability if he can show that he based nonpayment of taxes on a good-faith interpretation
of an arguable point of law); Chicago Bridge. 839 P.2d at 309.
14 See Cheek, 498 U.S. at 202-03; Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-502(2) (1999); see also Potter,
627 P.2d at 79 (voluntary intoxication is a defense if it negates mental state); State v.
Knoll, 712 P.2d 211,214-15 (Utah 1985); State v. Tebbs, 786 P.2d 775, 779 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990).
15 See Barnett, 945 F.2d at 1298; see also Potter, 627 P.2d at 78; Hamilton, 827 P.2d at
238 (trial court has duty to instruct jury on the law applicable to the case).
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Code Ann. § 76-8-1101(l)(b) and (l)(c). Under Utah law, a person is required to file a
state tax return if he was required to file a federal return. Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-502(1)
(2000). The state provisions overlap with the federal provisions. A defendant who failed
to make a federal filing may present the "good-faith" belief defense. Cheek. 498 U.S. at
200-03. Where the defendant believes in good faith that he was not required to file a
federal return, that defense must be available to explain why defendant likewise failed to
file a return under the state provisions. That is, since the state and federal filing
requirements overlap, a defendant must be allowed to raise the good-faith defense in state
criminal proceedings.
Also, a defendant'srightto present his theory of the case with the use of clear and
understandable instructions has its genesis in the right to fundamental fairness at trial and
the right to a jury trial. If a defendant is denied the opportunity to present his defense in
the form of instructions to the jury, he may be denied his rights under the Sixth
Amendment of the federal constitution. The United States Supreme Court in Cheek
stated, "forbidding the jury to consider evidence that might negate willfulness would raise
a serious question under the Sixth Amendment's jury trial provision." Cheek. 498 U.S. at
203. By failing to instruct the jury on Smith's defense, the trial judge in this case left the
jury without the necessary tools with which to make a proper determination regarding
Smith's culpability. That was error.
D. SMITH WAS ENTITLED TO HAVE THE JURY INSTRUCTED ON HIS
GOOD-FAITH BELIEF.
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1. Smith Presented Evidence of His Good-Faith Belief.
Under Utah law, before a defendant is entitled to have a jury instructed on his
defense, there must be some evidence of the defense in the record. See KnolL 712 P.2d at
214 (when there is a basis in the evidence, whether the evidence is produced by the
prosecution or by the defendant, which would provide some reasonable basis for the jury
to consider the defense, an instruction should be given to the jury).
Here, Smith presented evidence of good faith. (See R. 936:447-75); State v. Tebbs.
786 P.2d 775, 779 (Utah App. 1990) (the defendant assumes the burden of producing
some evidence if there is no evidence in the prosecution's case that would provide an
evidentiary foundation for the defense claimed); Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-504 (1999).
He presented evidence to support that he studied in good faith to determine
whether he was required to file a state or federal tax return. Smith conducted research
and read the Internal Revenue Code. (R. 936:447-48,460-62,475.) Through his research,
Smith learned that income could be derived from "non-taxable" sources, without taxable
liability; and he learned about sources of income within and without the United States.
(R. 936:443,470-71.) He also relied on articles and sought "professional opinions" in
determining whether he was required under the law to file a return. (R. 936:449.) Smith
was unable to locate any law that required him to file a tax return.
Smith asked judges and lawyers to identify for him those laws requiring him to file
a return. Smith testified that the judges and lawyers were not able to answer his
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questions. Smith testified that he sent letters to the state tax commission for information
and he made other efforts to ascertain his obligations as far as the tax laws were
concerned, but he received no response. Smith presented various theories and arguments
to judges and after his arguments were rejected, he continued to study more information
to refine his understanding of the law. (R. 936:460-64,474-75,488-90, 507.)
Smith determined after reviewing federal and state law and after questioning
several individuals regarding his tax obligations, that he was not a person required to file
a return under the law. (R. 936:475.)
Smith's honest and good-faith belief was a question for the jury. See Cheek, 498
U.S. at 203 (jury must be allowed to consider good-faith belief). Where the evidence
supports that Smith was mistaken in good faith about his status as a person required to file
state tax returns, that affirmative defense negates criminal intent. Smith was entitled to
have the jury instructed on his good-faith mistake of fact under Utah law. Utah Code
Ann. § 76-2-304(1): see also State v. Kazda. 545 P.2d 190, 192 (Utah 1976) Qury was
instructed in an understandable way that an honest mistake of fact constituted a defense);
see supra, note 9, herein.
In the event this Court determines that Smith's defense constituted a misunderstanding of the law, he was entitled to have the jury consider whether that good-faith
misunderstanding negated willfulness and intent. "A defendant charged with willful
failure to file a tax return is [] entitled to instructions that adequately inform the jury that
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the defendant is not guilty if he holds the mistaken, but good faith, belief that he is not
required to file a tax return (at least assuming, as is the case here, that such is raised by
the evidence)." Barnett 945 F.2d at 1298 (citing Cheek. 498 U.S. at 200); see also Utah
Code Ann. § 59-10-102 (2000) (legislature intended Utah tax provisions to conform to
federal provisions); Gray, 717 P.2d at 1317 (where Utah provisions are modeled after
federal provisions, Utah courts will look to federal interpretations); Hales Sand. 842 P.2d
at 895 (under Utah law, a taxpayer will escape liability if he can show that he based
nonpayment of taxes on a good-faith interpretation of an arguable point of law).
Smith presented evidence to negate specific criminal intent. According to the
evidence, he made every effort to understand the law and to conform to the law. As set
forth above, the "trial court [had] a duty to instruct the jury on the law applicable to the
facts of the case .. .[and the] defendant [had] a right 'to have his [or her] theory of the
case presented to the jury in a clear and understandable way." Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 238
(cite omitted). On that basis, Smith was entitled to a proper instruction.
2. Smith Requested an Instruction Regarding His Good-Faith Belief.
Smith proposed an instruction to the jury concerning his good-faith belief. (R.
502.) A copy of that instruction is attached hereto as Addendum E. Smith requested that
the trial judge instruct the jury with respect to willfulness and the good-faith defense as
set forth in Cheek, and as set forth in the first four paragraphs of the proposed instruction
(R. 960:194-209), as follows:
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Turning now to the third element of this offense. You are instructed that
the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's failure
to make a return was willful. Willfulness [is] the voluntary, intentional violation
of a known legal duty.
This means that before you can convict the defendant of willful failure to
file a 1995 state tax return and evasion of a tax[,] the state [must] prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that failure to make a return was willful.
The defendant's failure to make a return was willful if the law imposed a
duty on defendant to file a return; he know of this duty; and he voluntarily and
intentionally violated that duty.
The defendant's conduct was not willful if he acted through negligence,
inadvertence, mistake, or due to a good faith misunderstanding of the law. If the
defendant had a subjective good faith belief, no mater how unreasonable, that the
law did not require him to file tax returns, he did not act willfully. However, if the
defendant failed to make a return either because he disagreed with the tax laws or
he thought the tax laws to be unconstitutional, these beliefs would not amount to a
good faith misunderstanding of the law so as to excuse his failure to make tax
returns.
(R. 502.) Smith's proposed instruction was modeled after Cheek. See supra Point II.B.
It was consistent with the law and the facts presented in this case. See supra Point II.B.,
C, D. 1. The instruction should have been given to the jury. The trial court rejected the
instruction. (R. 960:194-209.) The trial court's ruling is attached as Addendum F. That
was improper. See Bamett, 945 F.2d at 1298 (a defendant charged with willful tax
evasion is entitled to instructions that inform the jury that the defendant is not guilty if he
holds the mistaken, but good faith, belief that he is not required to file tax return).
Next, the instructions provided to the jury failed to address the good-faith defense.
A set of the instructions provided to the jury is attached as Addendum G.
In this case, the trial judge instructed the jury on the statutory definitions for the
terms "intentionally," "with intent or willfully," "knowingly," "recklessly," and "with
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criminal negligence." (R. 579.) That instruction did not address "intentionally" or
"willfully" as those terms related to the tax evasion charges or the good-faith defense. See
Barnett 945 F.2d at 1298 ("The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the defendant
charged with willful failure tofilea tax return must have willfully failed tofileknowing
that he had a legal duty to do so") (citing Cheek. 498 U.S. at 200; U.S. v. Pomponio. 429
U.S. 10(1976); U.S. v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346(1973)): see also Cheek, 498 U.S. at 201.
Smith was entitled to a proper instruction on "intentionally" and "willfully" in connection
with his good-faith defense.16
Also, while the trial court instructed the jury that defendant presented evidence of
his studies, that instruction did not discuss the good-faith defense. (R. 580.) In fact, the
trial court advised the jury that defendant's evidence related to "whether or not the
defendant's failure to timelyfilea tax return for 1995 was knowing and willful and you
should not consider it for any other purpose." (R. 580-81.) That was inadequate.
The instructions failed to advise the jury that a good-faith belief may negate
criminal intent and willfulness, and therefore support an acquittal on the charges. They
failed to advise the jury that in light of the defense, the state would be required to refute
the good-faith belief with evidence that supported intent beyond a reasonable doubt. See
16 As set forth above, where the Utah tax provisions were enacted to conform to the
federal provisions, Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-102 (2000), and where the Utah legislature
enacted criminal provisions nearly identical to the federal provisions, this Court will look
to federal law in interpreting the Utah statutes. Gray, 717 P.2d at 1317; PowasniL 918
P.2d at 149. In that regard, the federal definitions for "intentionally " and "willfully" as
set forth in Cheek also define those terms as used in the Utah criminal tax provisions.
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Cheek. 498 U.S. at 202 (the government's burden requires "negating a defendant's claim
of ignorance of the law or a claim that because of a misunderstanding of the law" he had a
good-faith belief that he was not violating the law); KnolL 712 P.2d at 214-15 (if a
defense is raised, the prosecution is required to refute the defense by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt); Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, ^11; Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-502(2)
(government must negate a defense that is in issue as a result of evidence presented at
trial). The instructions did not allow the jury to consider Smith's good-faith defense in
any relevant context, and the instructions did not inform the jury that evidence of goodfaith may serve to negate the criminal intent or willfulness. That was error.
3. Smith Suffered Prejudice as a Result of the Error.
This Court will consider whether the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the
good-faith defense was prejudicial. To that end, this Court specifically will not assess
whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict and it will not "weigh the credibility of the evidence, a function reserved for the trier of fact." State v. Baker, 671 P.2d
152, 159 (Utah 1983). Rather, this Court will decide whether there was some evidence in
the record to support the instruction. See Baker. 671 P.2d at 159. That approach ensures
that the jury will be allowed to weigh and interpret the evidence. Id.; see Cheek, 498 U.S.
at 202-03 (it is for jury to decide whether evidence of good-faith belief negates elements
of crime); Bamett, 945 F.2d at 1298 (a defendant charged with tax evasion is entitled to
the good-faith defense instructions where there is evidence of the defense).
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In short, this Court must remand the matter for a new trial if any interpretation of
the evidence would support the defendant's theory of the case. See Baker, 671 P.2d at
159; State v. Crick. 675 P.2d 527, 532 (Utah 1983). "The requirement is more than a
procedural nicety; it is rooted in defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial." State v.
Standiford. 769 P.2d 254, 266 (Utah 1988).
In this case, the evidence supported an instruction on the good-faith defense. See
supra Point ILD. 1. The trial court should have instructed the jury on that defense so that
the jury could give meaning and context to the evidence. The jury should have been
instructed on the matter so that it could evaluate the evidence in the appropriate light and
determine whether defendant's evidence served to negate the intentional/willful element
of each offense. If the jury had been allowed to consider the evidence in the proper
context, it likely would have acquitted Smith of the charges.
p]f the Government proves actual knowledge of the pertinent legal duty, the prosecution, without more, has satisfied the knowledge component of the willfulness
requirement. But carrying this burden requires negating a defendant's claim of
ignorance of the law or a claim that because of a misunderstanding of the law, he
had a good-faith belief that he was not violating any of the provisions of the tax
laws. This is so because one cannot be aware that the law imposes a duty upon
him and yet be ignorant of it, misunderstand the law, or believe that the duty does
not exist. In the end, the issue is whether, based on all the evidence, the Government has proved that the defendant was aware of the duty at issue, which cannot
be true if the jury credits a good-faith misunderstanding and beliefsubmission,
whether or not the claimed belief or misunderstanding is objectively reasonable.
Cheek, 498 U.S. at 202 (emphasis added).
The trial court's failure to provide proper instructions prevented the jury from
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considering "evidence that might negate willfulness," Cheek, 498 U.S. at 203, thereby
undermining Smith's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. On that basis, this Court
should find prejudice as a result of the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury on the
good-faith belief.
ARGUMENT PRESENTED BY PRO SE DEFENDANT17
THE STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE OFFENSE OF TAX
EVASION,
Smith was convicted of two offenses in this matter: tax evasion a third degree
felony offense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101(l)(b), and tax evasion, a second
degree felony offense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101(1 )(c), Smith maintains the
evidence at trial was insufficient to support the conviction for either offense.
"We reverse the jury's verdict in a criminal case when we conclude as a
matter of law that the evidence was insufficient to warrant conviction," State v.
Smith, 927 P.2d 649,651 (Utah Ct. App, 1996) (quoting State v. Harman, 1G1Y2&
567, 568 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). The defendant must overcome a heavy burden in
challenging the sufficiency of evidence for a jury verdict. See id; State v. Vessey,
967 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). We view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the jury verdict,"State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 876 (Utah 1985), and
"will reverse only if the evidence is so 'inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime.9 Smith, 927 P.2d at 651 (quoting Harman, 767 P.2d at 568
(quoting Stale v, Petree, 659 P,2d 37 443, 444 (Utah 1983))). However, though the
burden is high, it is not impossible. See id. "We will not make speculative leaps
across gaps in the evidence." Id. (internal quotations and alterations omitted).
"Every element of the crime charged must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt."
Harman, 767 P.2d at 568. "To affirm the jury's verdict, we must be sure the State
has introduced evidence sufficient to support all elements of the charged crime."
Sm/Y/*,927P.2dat651.
17 See supra, note 1, herein.
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State v. Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136,110,2 P.3d 954; see also State v. Holgate. 2000 UT
74,f 18; 10 P.3d 346; State v. Leleae. 1999 UT App 368,1[17, 993 P.2d 232.
To succeed on a claim of insufficient evidence, the defendant "must marshal the
evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30,Tfl3,
25 P.3d 985 (citing State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98,1(14, 989 P.2d 1065).
In the event the evidence presented at trial is contradictory or conflicting, so long
as a reasonable interpretation of that evidence supports each element of the offense, this
Court will not disturb the jury's verdict. See Bovd, 2001 UT 30,1J14.
[W]e do not sit as a second trier of fact: "'It is the exclusive function of the jury to
weigh the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses.5 So long as
there is some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from which findings of all
the requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops."
Id. at H16 (quoting State v. Booker. 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985) (quoting State v.
Lamm. 606 P.2d 229,231 (Utah 1980))); see also State v. Cravens. 2000 UT App 344,
^[18, 15 P.3d 635 (it is the province of the trier of fact to determine which testimony to
believe and what inferences to drawfromthe facts); State v. Chaney. 1999 UT App
309,Tf30, 989 P.2d 1091 ("We may not weigh evidence or assess witness credibility, but
instead "assume that the jury believed the evidence and inferences that support the
verdict"); State v. James, 819 P.2d 781,784 (Utah 1991) (the mere existence of
conflicting evidence does not warrant reversal).
In addition, circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to support a conviction. It is
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well settled that "a conviction can be based on sufficient circumstantial evidence." State
v. Lvman. 966 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State v. Brown. 948 P.2d
337,344 (Utah 1997)). "'Circumstantial evidence need not be regarded as inferior
evidence if it is of such quality and quantity as to justify a jury in determining guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, and is sufficient to sustain a conviction."' Id. (quoting State v.
Nickles. 728 P.2d 123, 127 (Utah 1986)); see State v. Span, 819 .P,2d 329, 332-33 (Utah
1991). "[T]he inferences that can be drawnfromth[e] evidence [must] have a basis in
logic and reasonable human experience sufficient to prove each legal element of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt." Brown. 948 P.2d at 344 (quoting State v. Workman.
852 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 1993)).
Nevertheless, if the verdict "is based solely on inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative possibilities of guilt," the charge must be dismissed. Brown. 948 P.2d
at 344; see also State v. Spainhower. 1999 UT App 280, 15, 988 P.2d 452 (reversal is
required if the state has failed to establish an element of the offense with direct evidence
or reasonable inferences). With that in mind, the function of a reviewing court is to ensure
"that there is sufficient competent evidence as to each element of the charge to enable a
jury tofind,beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the crime," State v.
Media, 966 P.2d 270,272 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting James. 819 P.2d at 784).
In the instant matter, the state failed to present evidence sufficient to establish the
charges. As set forth below, the State completely failed to present any evidence to the
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jury that the Defendant was required to file a Federal Income Tax Return for 1995. As
will be pointed out if the Defendant is not required to file a Federal Return the Defendant
is not required to file a State Return. Thus, the requirement to file a Federal Return is an
element of the crime that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
THE STATE WAS REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE DEFENDANT
WAS REQUIRED TO FILE A FEDERAL INCOME TAX RETURN FOR
1995.
Many, including attorneys and judges, believe that the Utah income tax scheme is
just patterned after the Federal income tax scheme and that there is just a minimum of
nexus between the two. In this they error. The Utah State income tax scheme is more
than patterned after the Federal income tax scheme. It is wholly dependant on the Federal
income tax scheme to the extent that the Utah income tax scheme is part and parcel of the
Federal income tax scheme. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-10-102; 59-10-103; 59-10-111;
59-10-112; 59-10-117; 59-10-122; 59-10-201.1; 59-10-502.
Persons required to file returns. An income tax return with respect to the tax imposed by this chapter shall be filed by: (1) every resident individual, estate, or trust
required to file a federal income tax return for the taxable year. Utah Code 59-10-502
(emphasis added).
Thus, pursuant to statute the requirement to file a federal income tax return
becomes an element of the crime which must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
It is well settled that in all criminal trials the requirement to file an income tax
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return is an issue of fact and must be decided by a trier of fact. Thus the State was
required to make a presentment of evidence sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable
doubt that a federal trier of fact had determined that the Defendant had requirement to file
a federal income tax return for the year 1995. A full marshaling of all of the evidence and
testimony reveals that the State presented no such evidence of any kind. The State did not
even make a presentment of evidence and/or testimony that could be considered
circumstantial and/or sufficient to infer that a federal trier of fact had determined that the
Defendant had requirement tofilea federal income tax return for the year 1995. In fact
both the State and the Court skirted the issue of a federal filing requirement in it entirety.
There jury cannot be expected to bridge gaps in the evidence and make assumptions based on evidence and testimony that was not given and that is not before them.
Based on the preceding paragraph the state must present some evidence that a
federal trier of fact has made a determination that the Defendant had a requirement to file
a federal income tax return.
Wherefore, the State having not proven the element of a federal filing requirement
and the verdict being based solely on remote or speculative possibilities of guilt, the
charge must be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Smith respectfully requests that this Court enter an
order reversing and remanding this case for further proceedings as appropriate.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 991920225 FS

THOMAS HOWARD SMITH,
Defendant

Judge:
Date:

RAYMOND S. UNO
September 7, 2001

PRESENT
Clerk:
marcyt
Prosecutor: MARK W BAER
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): RONALD S FUJINO
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: January 16, 1943
Video
Tape Number:
1:08
CHARGES
1. TAX EVASION - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/11/2001 (Guilty Plea}
2. TAX EVASION - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty

- Disposition:

04/11/2001 {Guilty

Plea}

SENTENCE PRISON
Based on t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n v i c t i o n of TAX EVASION a 3 r d Degree
F e l o n y , t h e d e f e n d a n t i s s e n t e n c e d t o a n i n d e t e r m i n a t e t e r m of n o t
to exceed five y e a r s i n t h e Utah S t a t e P r i s o n .
The p r i s o n t e r m i s s u s p e n d e d .
Based on t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n v i c t i o n of TAX EVASION a 2 n d Degree
F e l o n y , t h e d e f e n d a n t i s s e n t e n c e d t o a n i n d e t e r m i n a t e t e r m of n o t
l e s s t h a n one y e a r n o r more t h a n f i f t e e n y e a r s i n t h e U t a h S t a t e
Prison.

The prison term is suspended.

Darto

1

Case No: 991920225
Date:
Sep 07, 2001

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Counts are to run concurrent.

SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

$1000.00
$0.00
$459.46
$1000.00

Charge # 2

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

$2500.00
$0.00
$1148.65
$2500.00

Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Principal Due:

$3500.00
$0
$1608.11
$3500.00
Plus Interest

ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s) .
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole.
Defendant is to pay a fine of 3500.00 which includes the surcharge.
Interest may increase the final amount due.
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult
Probation & Parole.
Defendant is to cooperate with the Tax Commission and file returns
for all years requested.
Defendant is to make any future tax filings.
Defendant is to complete 500 hours community service doing service
approved by APPD.
Defendant is to pay a fine of $3500 which includes the surcharge.
Paoe 2

Case No: 991920225
Date:
Sep 07, 2001
A review hearing is set for March 15, 2002 at 8:30 a.m.
Defendant is to keep the State informed of his address at all
times.
REVIEW HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 03/15/2002
Time: 08:30 a.m.
Location: Third Floor - W37
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE STREET
SLC, UT 84111-1860
Before Judge: MICHAEL K. BURTON

In compliance with the Americans with Disabilit^^^ttw^iidividuals
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary ^utflmunicative
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Third
District Court-Salt Lake at 238-7058 at least three working days
prior to the proceeding. The general information phone number is
(801)238-7300.
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State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

ORDER

v.
Case No. 20010817-CA
Thomas Smith,
Defendant and Appellant.

This matter is before the court on a motion to allow
Appellant to file his own pro se brief in addition to, and
separate from, the brief filed on his behalf by his counsel of
record, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association (LDA) .
As Appellant's counsel of record in this court, LDA is
obligated to be an active advocate in behalf the client and
support the client's appeal to the best of its ability. See
State v. Wells, 2000 UT App 304, \4, 13 P.3d 1056 (citing State
v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168, 169 (Utah 1981)). If Appellant wishes
to raise issues that LDA believes are meritless or otherwise
unsupported, LDA should incorporate those issues into its brief
under the guidelines of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967)
and State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981). This procedure
allows the court to fully evaluate all of Appellant's issues on
appeal in the most effective and efficient format.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to allow Appellant to
file his own pro se brief is denied.
DATED this 2H
FOR THE COURT:

day of April, 2002.

ADDENDUM C

76-8-1101. Operating without tax license — Tax evasion —
Statute of limitations.
(1) As provided in Section 59-1-401:
(a) Any person who is required by Title 59 or any laws the State Tax
Commission administers or regulates to register with or obtain a license or
permit from the State Tax Commission, or who operates without having
registered or secured a license or permit, or who operates when the
registration, license, or permit is expired or not current, is guilty of a class
B misdemeanor, except that, notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, thefineis
not less than $500 nor more than $1,000.
(b) Any person who, with intent to evade any tax or requirement of Title
59 or any lawful requirement of the State Tax Commission, fails to make,
render, sign, or verify any return or to supply any information within the
time required under this title, or who makes, renders, signs, or verifies any
false or fraudulent return or statement, or who supplies any false or
fraudulent information, is guilty of a third degree felony, except that,
notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, the fine is not less than $1,000 nor
more than $5,000.
(c) Any person who willfully attempts to evade or defeat any tax or the
payment thereof is, in addition to other penalties provided by law, guilty
of a second degree felony, except that, notwithstanding Section 76-3-301,
the fine is not less than $1,500 nor more than $25,000.
(2) The statute of limitations for prosecution for a violation of this section is
six years from the date the tax should have been remitted.

59-10-502. Persons required to file returns.
An income tax return with respect to the tax imposed by this chapter shall
be filed by:
(1) every resident individual, estate, or trust required to file a federal
income tax return for the taxable year; and
(2) every nonresident individual, estate, or trust having federal gross
income derived from sources within the state for the taxable year and
required to file a federal income tax return for such taxable year.

76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal
episode — Included offenses.
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all
separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the
same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses
which may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this
code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or
conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under
any other such provision.
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single
criminal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a
defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when:
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment.
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included
offense. An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included
therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense.
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense.
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence
to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient
evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact
necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included offense,
the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a
judgment of conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a
new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant.
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111 S.Ct. 604
112 L.Ed.2d 617, 59 USLW 4049,67 A.F.T.R.2d 91-344, 91-1 USTC P 50,012
(Cite as: 498 U.S. 192, 111 S.Ct. 604)
^

Justice Souter did not participate.
Supreme Court of the United States
Opinion on remand, 931 F.2d 1206.
John L. CHEEK, Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES.
No. 89-658.
Argued Oct. 3, 1990.
Decided Jan. 8, 1991.

Defendant was convicted in the United
States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, Paul E. Plunkett, J., of
attempting to evade income taxes and
failing to file income tax returns, and he
appealed. The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed, 882 F.2d 1263.
The United States Supreme Court, Justice
White, held that: (1) defendant was not
entitled to acquittal based on good-faith
belief that income tax law was
unconstitutional as applied to him and thus
did not legally impose any duty on him,
but (2) defendant's good-faith belief that
the tax laws did not impose any duty on
him did not have to be objectively
reasonable in order to be considered by the
jury.
Vacated and remanded.
Justice Scalia, filed an opinion concurring
in the judgment.
Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting
opinion in which Justice Marshall joined.
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Headnotes

HI Criminal Law ^ 3 1 3
110k313 Most Cited Cases
Based on the notion that the law is definite
and knowable, common law presumed that
every person knew the law.
HI Internal Revenue ^5263.35
220k5263.35 Most Cited Cases
"Willfulness" for purposes of criminal tax
laws requires the Government to prove
that the law imposed a duty on the
defendant, that the defendant knew of the
duty, and that he voluntarily and
intentionally violated that duty. 26
U.S.C.A. $S 7201. 7203.
|31 Criminal Law ° ^ 2 0
110k20 Most Cited Cases
Where issue is whether defendant knew of
duty purportedly imposed by statute or
regulation he is accused of violating, if
Government proves actual knowledge of
the pertinent legal duty, the prosecution,
without more, has satisfied the knowledge
component of the willfulness requirement.
| £ Internal Revenue e=:>5300
220k5300 Most Cited Cases
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Government has not proved that defendant
was aware of the duty imposed by the tax
law which he is accused of willfully
disobeying if the jury credits a good- faith
misunderstanding and belief submission,
whether or not the claimed belief or
misunderstanding is objectively
reasonable. 26U.S.C.A. S§ 7201.7203,
[5] Internal Revenue ^^5263.35
220k5263.35 Most Cited Cases
Defendant's claimed good-faith belief need
not be objectively reasonable in order for
it to negate Government's evidence
purporting to show defendant's awareness
of his duties under the tax laws. 26
U.S.C.A. S§ 720L 7203.
I £ Constitutional Law e ^ 3 8
92k38 Most Cited Cases
Where possible, court interprets
congressional enactments so as to avoid
raising serious constitutional questions.
iH Internal Revenue e==>5317
220k5317 Most Cited Cases
It was error to instruct the jury to disregard
evidence of defendant's understanding
that, within meaning of the tax laws, he
was not person required to file a return or
to pay income taxes and that wages are not
taxable income, as incredible as those
misunderstandings of and beliefs about the
tax law might be. 26 U.S.C.A. SS 7201.
7203.
[81 Internal Revenue €>3;>5263.35
220k5263.35 Most Cited Cases

Defendant's good-faith belief that income
tax law was unconstitutional as applied to
him did not provide defense to charges of
willfully attempting to evade income taxes
and failing to file income tax returns,
notwithstanding claim that, because of his
belief in the unconstitutionality of the tax
laws as applied to him, the income tax
laws could not legally impose any duty
upon him of which he should have been
aware. 26U.S.C.A. SS 720L 7203.
**605 Syllabus SEN?}
FN* The syllabus constitutes no
part of the opinion of the Court but
has been prepared by the Reporter
of Decisions for the convenience of
the reader. See United States v.
Detroit Lumber Co.. 200 U.S. 32L
337, 26 S.Ct. 282. 287, 50 L.Ed.
499.
Petitioner Cheek was charged with six
counts of willfully failing to file a federal
income tax return in violation of§7203of
the Internal Revenue Code (Code) and
three counts of willfully attempting to
evade his income taxes in violation of §
7201. Although adm itting that he had not
filed his returns, he testified that he had
not acted willfully because he sincerely
believed, based on his indoctrination by a
group believing that the federal tax system
is unconstitutional and his own study, that
the tax laws were being unconstitutionally
enforced and that his actions were lawful.
In instructing the jury, the court stated that
an honest but unreasonable belief is not a
defense and does not negate willfulness,
and that Cheek's beliefs that wages are not
income and that he was not a taxpayer
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within the meaning of the Code were not
objectively reasonable. It also instructed
the jury that a personfs opinion that the tax
laws violate his constitutional rights does
not constitute
a
good-faith
misunderstanding of the law. Cheek was
convicted, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed.
Held:
1. A good-faith misunderstanding of the
law or a good-faith belief that one is not
violating the law negates willfulness,
whether or not the claimed belief or
misunderstanding is objectively
reasonable. Statutory willfulness, which
protects the average citizen from
prosecution for innocent mistakes made
due to the complexity of the tax laws,
United States v. Murdoch 290 U.S. 389.
54 S.Ct. 223, 78 L.Ed. 381. is the
voluntary, intentional violation of a known
legal duty. United States v. Pomponio.
429 U.S. 10. 97 S.Ct. 22. 50 L.Ed.2d 12.
Thus, if the jury credited Cheeks assertion
that he truly believed that the Code did not
treat wages as income, the Government
would not have carried its burden to prove
willfulness, however unreasonable a court
might deem such a belief. Characterizing
a belief as objectively unreasonable* *606
transforms what is normally a factual
inquiry into a legal one, thus preventing a
jury from considering it. And forbidding
a jury to consider evidence that might
negate willfulness would raise a serious
question under the Sixth Amendment's
jury trial provision, which this
interpretation of the statute avoids. Of
course, in deciding whether to credit
Cheek's claim, the jury is free to consider

any admissible evidence showing that he
had knowledge of his legal duties. Pp.
609-612.
*193 2. It was proper for the trial court to
instruct the jury not to consider Cheek's
claim that the tax laws are
unconstitutional, since a defendant's views
about the tax statutes' validity are
irrelevant to the issue of willfulness and
should not be heard by a jury. Unlike the
claims in the Murdock-Pomponio line of
cases, claims that Code provisions are
unconstitutional do not arise from innocent
mistakes caused by the Code's complexity.
Rather, they reveal full knowledge of the
provisions at issue and a studied
conclusion that those provisions are
invalid and unenforceable. Congress could
not have contemplated that a taxpayer,
without risking criminal prosecution, could
ignore his duties under the Code and
refuse to utilize the mechanisms Congress
provided to present his invalidity claims to
the courts and to abide by their decisions.
Cheek was free to pay the tax, file for a
refund, and, if denied, present his claims to
the courts. Also, without paying the tax,
he could have challenged claims of tax
deficiencies in the Tax Court.
Pp.
612-613.
882 F.2d 1263, fCA7 1989^ vacated and
remanded.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the
Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and
STEVENS, O'CONNOR, and KENNEDY,
JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment, post, p. 613.
BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting
opinion, in which MARSHALL, J., joined,
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post, p. 614. SOUTER, J., took no part in
the consideration or decision of the case.
William R. Coulson argued the cause for
petitioner. With him on the briefs was
Susan M. Keegan.
Edwin S. Kneedler argued the cause for
the United States. With him on the brief
were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant
Attorney General Peterson, Deputy
Solicitor General Bryson, Robert E.
Lindsay, and Alan Hechtkopf

Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of
the Court.
Title 26, S 7201 of the United States Code
provides that any person "who willfully
attempts in any manner to evade or defeat
any tax imposed by this title or the
payment thereof1 shall be guilty of a
felony. Under 26 U.S.C. 6 7203. "[a]nv
person required under this title ... or by
regulations made under authority thereof
to make a return... who willfully fails to...
make such return" shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor. *194 This case turns on
the meaning of the word "willfully" as
used in SS 7201 and 7203.
I
Petitioner John L. Cheek has been a pilot
for American Airlines since 1973. He filed
federal income tax returns through 1979
but thereafter ceased to file returns. [FN1]
He also claimed an increasing number of
withholding allowances—eventually
claiming 60 allowances by mid-1980—and

for the years 1981 to 1984 indicated on his
W-4 forms that he was exempt from
federal income taxes. In 1983, petitioner
unsuccessfully sought a refund of all tax
withheld by his employer in 1982.
Petitioner's income during this period at all
times far exceeded the minimum necessary
to trigger the statutory filing requirement.

FN1. Cheek did file what the Court
of Appeals described as a frivolous
return in 1982.

As a result of his activities, petitioner was
indicted for 10 violations of federal law.
He was charged with six counts of
willfully failing to file a federal income tax
return for the years 1980, 1981, and 1983
through 1986, in violation of $7203. He
was further charged with three counts of
willfully attempting to **607 evade his
income taxes for the years 1980,1981, and
1983 in violation of 26 U.S.C. S 7201. In
those years, American Airlines withheld
substantially less than the amount of tax
petitioner owed because of the numerous
allowances and exempt status he claimed
on his W-4 forms. [FN2] The tax
offenses with which petitioner was
charged are specific intent crimes that
require the defendant to have acted
willfully.

FN2. Because petitioner filed a
refund claim for the entire amount
withheld by his employer in 1982,
petitioner was also charged under
18 U.S.C. $287 with one count of
presenting a claim to an agency of
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the United States knowing the
claim to be false and fraudulent.

At trial, the evidence established that
between 1982 and 1986, petitioner was
involved in at least four civil cases that
*195 challenged various aspects of the
federal income tax system. [FN3] In all
four of those cases, the plaintiffs were
informed by the courts that many of their
arguments, including that they were not
taxpayers within the meaning of the tax
laws, that wages are not income, that the
Sixteenth Amendment does not authorize
the imposition of an income tax on
individuals, and that the Sixteenth
Amendment is unenforceable, were
frivolous or had been repeatedly rejected
by the courts. During this time period,
petitioner also attended at least two
criminal trials of persons charged with tax
offenses. In addition, there was evidence
that in 1980 or 1981 an attorney had
advised Cheek that the courts had rejected
asfrivolousthe claim that wages are not
income. [FN4]
FN3. In March 1982, Cheek and
another employee of the company
sued American Airlines to
challenge the withholding of
federal income taxes. In April
1982, Cheek sued the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) in the
United States Tax Court, asserting
that he was not a taxpayer or a
person for purposes of the Internal
Revenue Code and that his wages
were not income, and making
several other related claims.

Cheek and four others alsofiledan
action against the United States and
the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue in Federal District Court,
claiming that withholding taxes
from their wages violated the
Sixteenth Amendment. Finally, in
1985 Cheek filed claims with the
IRS seeking to have refunded the
taxes withheld from his wages in
1983 and 1984.
When these
claims were not allowed, he
brought suit in the District Court
claiming that the withholding was
an unconstitutional taking of his
property and that his wages were
not income. In dismissing this
action as frivolous, the District
Court imposed costs and attorneys
fees of $ 1,500 and a sanction under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11
in the amount of $10,000. The
Court of Appeals agreed that
Cheek's claims were frivolous,
reduced the District Court sanction
to $5,000, and imposed an
additional sanction of $1,500 for
bringing afrivolousappeal.
FN4. The attorney also advised that
despite the Fifth Amendment, the
filing of a tax return was required
and that a person could challenge
the constitutionality of the system
by suing for a refund after the taxes
had been withheld, or by putting
himself "at risk of criminal
prosecution."
Cheek represented himself at trial and
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testified in his defense. He admitted that
he had not filed personal income tax
returns during the years in question. He
testified that as early as 1978, he had
begun attending seminars sponsored *196
by, and following the advice of, a group
that believes, among other things, that the
federal tax system is unconstitutional.
Some of the speakers at these meetings
were lawyers who purported to give
professional opinions about the invalidity
of the federal income tax laws. Cheek
produced a letter from an attorney stating
that the Sixteenth Amendment did not
authorize a tax on wages and salaries but
only on gain or profit. Petitioner's defense
was that, based on the indoctrination he
receivedfromthis group andfromhis own
study, he sincerely believed that the tax
laws were being unconstitutionally
enforced and that his actions during the
1980-1986 period were lawful.
He
therefore argued that he had acted without
the willfulness required for conviction of
the various offenses with which he was
charged.
In the course of its instructions, the trial
court advised the jury that to prove
"willfulness" the Government must prove
the voluntary and intentional violation of a
known legal duty, a burden that could not
be proved by showing mistake, ignorance,
or negligence. **608 The court further
advised the jury that an objectively
reasonable good-faith misunderstanding of
the law would negate willfulness, but mere
disagreement with the law would not.
The court described Cheek's beliefs about
the income tax system [FN5] and
instructed the jury that if it found that
Cheek "honestly and reasonably believed

that *197 he was not required to pay
income taxes or to file tax returns," App.
81, a not guilty verdict should be returned.

FN5. "The defendant has testified
as to what he states are his
interpretations of the United States
Constitution, court opinions,
common law atnd other materials he
has reviewed.... He has also
introduced materials which contain
references to quotations from the
United States Constitution, court
opinions, statutes, and other
sources.
"He testified he relied on his
interpretations and on these
materials in concluding that he was
not a person required to file income
tax returns for the year or years
charged, was not required to pay
income taxes and that he could
claim exempt status on his W-4
forms, and that he could claim
refunds of all moneys withheld."
App. 75-76.
"Among other things, Mr. Cheek
contends that his wages from a
private employer, American
Airlines, does [sic ] not constitute
income under the Internal Revenue
Service laws." Id, at 81.
After several hours of deliberation, the
jury sent a note to the judge that stated in
part:
" 'We have a basic disagreement between
some of us as to if Mr. Cheek honestly &
reasonably believed that he was not
required to pay income taxes.
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'Page 32 [the relevant jury instruction]
discusses good faith misunderstanding &
disagreement. Is there any additional
clarification you can give us on this
point?1" Id, at 85.
The District Judge responded with a
supplemental instruction containing the
following statements:
"[A] person's opinion that the tax laws
violate his constitutional rights does not
constitute a good faith misunderstanding
of the law. Furthermore, a person's
disagreement with the government's tax
collection systems and policies does not
constitute a good faith misunderstanding
of the law." Id, at 86.
At the end of thefirstday of deliberation,
the jury sent out another note saying that it
still could not reach a verdict because "
'[w]e are divided on the issue as to if Mr.
Cheek honestly & reasonably believed that
he was not required to pay income tax.'"
Id, at 87. When the jury resumed its
deliberations, the District Judge gave the
jury an additional instruction. This
instruction stated in part that f,[a]n honest
but unreasonable belief is not a defense
and does not negate willfulness," id, at 88,
and that "[a]dvice or research resulting in
the conclusion that wages of a privately
employed person are not income or that the
tax laws are unconstitutional is not
objectively reasonable and cannot serve as
the basis for a good faith misunderstanding
of the law defense." Ibid. The court also
instructed the jury that "[pjersistent refusal
to acknowledge the law does not constitute
a good *198 faith misunderstanding of the

law." Ibid. Approximately two hours
later, the jury returned a verdict finding
petitioner guilty on all counts. [FN6]
FN6. A note signed by all 12 jurors
also informed the judge that
although the jury found petitioner
guilty, several jurors wanted to
express their personal opinions of
the case and that notes from these
individual jurors to the court were
"a complaint against the narrow &
hard expression under the
constraints of the law." Id., at 90.
At least two notes from individual
jurors expressed the opinion that
petitioner sincerely believed in his
cause even though his beliefs might
have been unreasonable.

Petitioner appealed his convictions,
arguing that the District Court erred by
instructing the jury that only an objectively
reasonable misunderstanding of the law
negates the statutory willfulness
requirement. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected
that contention and affirmed the
convictions. 882 F.2d 1263 (1989). In
prior cases, the Seventh Circuit had made
clear that good-faith misunderstanding of
the law negates willfulness only if the
defendant's **609 beliefs are objectively
reasonable; in the Seventh Circuit, even
actual ignorance is not a defense unless the
defendant's ignorance was itself
objectively reasonable. See, e.g., United
States v. Buckner. 830 F.2d 102 (1987V
In its opinion in this case, the court noted
that several specified beliefs, including the
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beliefs that the tax laws are
unconstitutional and that wages are not
income, would not be objectively
reasonable.JTN7] Because the Seventh
Circuit's *199 interpretation of "willfully"
as used in these statutes conflicts with the
decisions of several other Courts of
Appeals, see, e.g., United States v.
Whiteside. 810 F.2d 1306, 1310-1311
(CA5 1987): United States v. Phillips.
775 F.2d 262. 263-264 (CAIO 1985):
United States v. Aitken. 755 F.2d 188.
191-193 fCAl 1985). we granted
certiorari, 493 U.S. 1068.110 S.Ct. 1108.
107 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1990).

return violates the privilege against
self-incriminaition; and
"(7) the belief that Federal Reserve
Notes do not constitute cash or
income.
"Miller v. United States. 868 F.2d
236. 239-41 (7th Cir.1989):
Buckner. 830 F.2d at 102: United
States v. Dube. 820 F.2d 886. 891
(7th Cir.1987):
Coleman v.
Comm'r. 791 F.2d 68. 70-71 (7th
Cir.1986): Moore. 627 F.2d at 833.
We have no doubt that this list will
increase with time."

II
FN7. The opinion stated, 882 F.2d
1263.1268-1269. n. 2 (CA7 1989).
as follows:
"For the record, we note that the
following beliefs, which are stock
arguments of the tax protester
movement, have not been, nor ever
will be, considered 'objectively
reasonable1 in this circuit: "(1) the
belief that the sixteenth amendment
to the constitution was improperly
ratified and therefore never came
into being;
"(2) the belief that the sixteenth
amendment is unconstitutional
generally;
"(3) the belief that the income tax
violates the takings clause of the
fifth amendment;
"(4) the belief that the tax laws are
unconstitutional;
"(5) the belief that wages are not
income and therefore are not
subject to federal income tax laws;
"(6) the belief that filing a tax

[1] The general rule that ignorance of the
law or a mistake of law is no defense to
criminal prosecution is deeply rooted in
the American legal system. See, e.g.,
United States v. Smith. 5 Wheat 153.182.
5 L.Ed. 57 (1820) (Livingston, J.,
dissenting); Barlow v. United States. 1
Pet. 404. 411. 8 L.Ed. 728 (1833):
Reynolds v. United States. 98 U.S. 145.
167. 25 L.Ed. 244
(1879):
Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota. 218
U.S. 57. 68. 30 S.Ct. 663. 666. 54 L.Ed.
930 (1910V Lambert v. California. 355
U.S. 225. 228. 78 S.Ct. 240. 242. 2
L.Ed.2d 228 (1957): Liparota v. United
States. All U.S. 419.441.105 S.Ct 2084.
2096. 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985) (WHITE, J.,
dissenting); O. Holmes, The Common
Law 47-48 (1881). Based on the notion
that the law is definite and knowable, the
common law presumed that every person
knew the law. This common-law rule has
been applied by the Court in numerous
cases construing criminal statutes. See,
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e.g., United States v. International
Minerals & Chemical Corp.. 402 U.S.
558. 91 S.Ct. 1697. 29 L.Ed.2d 178
(1971): Hamling v. United States. 418
U.S. 87. 119424. 94 S.Ct. 2887.
2808-2911.41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974): Bovce
Motor Lines. Inc. v. United States. 342
U.S. 337. 72 S.Ct. 329. 96 L.Ed. 367
(1952).
The proliferation of statutes and
regulations has sometimes made it difficult
for the average citizen to know and
comprehend *200 the extent of the duties
and obligations imposed by the tax laws.
Congress has accordingly softened the
impact ofthe common-law presumption by
making specific intent to violate the law an
element of certain federal criminal tax
offenses. Thus, the Court almost 60 years
ago interpreted the statutory term
"willfully" as used in the federal criminal
tax statutes as carving out an exception to
the traditional rule. This special treatment
of criminal tax offenses is largely due to
the complexity of the tax laws. In United
States v. Murdoch. 290 U.S. 389. 54 S.Ct.
223. 78 L.Ed. 381 (1933). the Court
recognized that:
"Congress did not intend that a person,
by reason of a bona fide
misunderstanding as **610 to his
liability for the tax, as to his duty to
make a return, or as to the adequacy of
the records he maintained, should
become a criminal by his mere failure to
measure up to the prescribed standard of
conduct." Id. at 396. 54 S.Ct.. at 226.
The Court held that the defendant was
entitled to an instruction with respect to
whether he acted in good faith based on

his actual belief. In Murdoch, the Court
interpreted the term "willfully" as used in
the criminal tax statutes generally to mean
"an act done with a bad purpose," id., at
394. 54 S.Ct. at 225. or with "an evil
motive," id. at 395. 54 S.Ct. at 225.
Subsequent decisions have refined this
proposition. In United States v. Bishop.
412 U.S. 346. 93 S.Ct. 2008. 36 L.Ed.2d
941 (1973). we described the term
"willfully" as connoting "a voluntary,
intentional violation of a known legal
duty," id. at 360. 93 S.Ct. at 2017. and
did so with specific reference to the "bad
faith or evil intent" language employed in
Murdoch. Still later, United States v.
Pomponio. 429 U.S. 10. 97 S.Ct. 22. 50
L.Ed.2d 12 (1976) (per curiam ),
addressed a situation in which several
defendants had been charged with willfully
filing false tax returns. The jury was
given an instruction on willfulness similar
to the standard set forth in Bishop. In
addition, it was instructed that " f[g]ood
motive alone is never a defense where the
act done or omitted is a crime.1" Id. at 11.
97 S.Ct. at 23. The defendants were
convicted but the Court of Appeals
reversed, concluding that the latter
instruction *201 was improper because the
statute required a finding of bad purpose
or evil motive. Ibid.
We reversed the Court of Appeals, stating
that "the Court of Appeals incorrectly
assumed that the reference to an fevil
motive1 in United States v. Bishop, supra.
and prior cases," ibid., "requires proof of
any motive other than an intentional
violation of a known legal duty." Id., at
12. 97 S.Ct. at 23. As "the other Courts
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of Appeals that have considered the
question have recognized, willfulness in
this context simply means a voluntary,
intentional violation of a known legal
duty." Ibid We concluded that after
instructing the jury on willfulness, "[a]n
additional instruction on good faith was
unnecessary." Id. at 13.97 S.Ct. at 24.
Taken together, Bishop and Pomponio
conclusively establish that the standard for
the statutory willfulness requirement is the
"voluntary, intentional violation of a
known legal duty."
Ill
Cheek accepts the Pomponio definition of
willfulness, Brief for Petitioner 5, and n. 4,
13,36; Reply Brief for Petitioner 4, 6-7,
11, 13, but asserts that the District Court's
instructions and the Court of Appeals1
opinion departed from that definition. In
particular, he challenges the ruling that a
good-faith misunderstanding of the law or
a good-faith belief that one is not violating
the law, if it is to negate willfulness, must
be objectively reasonable. We agree that
the Court ofAppeals and the District Court
erred in this respect.
A
[2] [3] [4] Willfulness, as construed by our
prior decisions in criminal tax cases,
requires the Government to prove that the
law imposed a duty on the defendant, that
the defendant knew of this duty, and that
he voluntarily and intentionally violated
that duty. We deal first with the case
where the issue is whether the defendant
knew of the duty purportedly imposed by
the provision of the statute or regulation he

is accused of violating, a case in which
there is no claim that the provision *202 at
issue is invalid. In such a case, if the
Government proves actual knowledge of
the pertinent legal duty, the prosecution,
without more, has satisfied the knowledge
component of the willfulness requirement.
But carrying this burden requires negating
a defendant's claim of ignorance of the law
or a claim that because of a
misunderstanding of the law, he had a
good-faith belief that he was not violating
any of the provisions of the tax laws. This
is so **611 because one cannot be aware
that the law imposes a duty upon him and
yet be ignorant of it, misunderstand the
law, or believe that the duty does not exist.
In the end, the issue is whether, based on
all the evidence, the Government has
proved that the defendant was aware of the
duty at issue, which cannot be true if the
jury credits a good-faith misunderstanding
and belief submission, whether or not the
claimed belief or misunderstanding is
objectively reasonable.
In this case, if Cheek asserted that he truly
believed that the Internal Revenue Code
did not purport to treat wages as income,
and the jury believed him, the Government
would not have carried its burden to prove
willfulness, however unreasonable a court
might deem such a belief. Of course, in
deciding whether to credit Cheek's
good-faith belief claim, the jury would be
free to consider any admissible evidence
from any source showing that Cheek was
aware of his duty to file a return and to
treat wages as income, including evidence
showing his awareness of the relevant
provisions of the Code or regulations, of
court decisions rejecting his interpretation
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of the tax law, of authoritative rulings of
the Internal Revenue Service, or of any
contents of the personal income tax return
forms and accompanying instructions that
made it plain that wages should be
returned as income.JTN8]

FN8. Cheek recognizes that a
"defendant who knows what the
law is and who disagrees with it...
does not have a bona fide
misunderstanding defense," but
asserts that "a defendant who has a
bona fide misunderstanding of [the
law] does not 'know1 his legal duty
and lacks willfulness." Brief for
Petitioner 29, and n. 13.
The
Reply Brief for Petitioner, at 13,
states:
"We are in no way
suggesting that Cheek or anyone
else is immune from criminal
prosecution if he knows what the
law is, but believes it should be
otherwise, and therefore violates
it." See also Tr. of Oral Arg. 9,11,
12,15,17.

[5][6] *203 We thus disagree with the
Court of Appeals1 requirement that a
claimed good-faith belief must be
objectively reasonable if it is to be
considered as possibly negating the
Government's evidence purporting to show
a defendant's awareness of the legal duty at
issue.
Knowledge and belief are
characteristically questions for the
factfinder, in this case the jury.
Characterizing a particular belief as not
objectively reasonable transforms the
inquiry into a legal one and would prevent

the jury from considering it. It would of
course be proper to exclude evidence
having no relevance or probative value
with respect to willfulness; but it is not
contrary to common sense, let alone
impossible, for a defendant to be ignorant
of his duty based on an irrational belief
that he has no duty, and forbidding the jury
to consider evidence that might negate
willfulness would raise a serious question
under the Sixth Amendment's jury trial
provision. Cf. Francis v. Franklin. 471
U.S. 307.105 S.Ct. 1965. 85 L.Ed.2d 344
(1985V, Sandstrom v. Montana. 442 U.S.
510.99 S.Ct 2450.61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979):
Morissette v. United States. 342 U.S. 246,
72 S.Ct. 240. 96 L.Ed. 288 (19521 It is
common ground that this Court, where
possible, interprets congressional
enactments so as to avoid raising serious
constitutional questions.
See, e.g.,
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida
Gulf Coast Building & Construction
Trades Council. 485 U.S. 568. 575, 108
S.Ct. 1392.1397. 99 L.Ed.2d 645 (1988V
Crowellv. Benson. 285 U.S. 22.62. andn.
30. 52 S.Ct 285.296. and n. 30. 76 L.Ed.
598(1932): Public Citizen v. Department
of Justice. 491 U.S. 440. 465-466. 109
S.Ct. 2558. 2572-2573. 105 L.Ed.2d 377
(1989).
[7] It was therefore error to instruct the
jury to disregard evidence of Cheek's
understanding that, within the meaning of
the tax laws, he was not a person required
to file a return or to pay income taxes and
that wages are not taxable income, as
incredible as such misunderstandings of
and beliefs about the law might be. Of
course, the more unreasonable the
assertedbeliefs *204 or misunderstandings
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are, the more likely the jury will consider
them to be nothing more than simple
**612 disagreement with known legal
duties imposed by the tax laws and will
find that the Government has carried its
burden of proving knowledge.
B
[8] Cheek asserted in the trial court that he
should be acquitted because he believed in
good faith that the income tax law is
unconstitutional as applied to him and thus
could not legally impose any duty upon
him of which he should have been aware.
[FN9] Such a submission is unsound, not
because *205 Cheek's constitutional
arguments are not objectively reasonable
or frivolous, which they surely are, but
because the Murdock-Pornponio line of
cases does not support such a position.
Those cases construed the willfulness
requirement in the criminal provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code to require proof
of knowledge of the law. This was
because in "our complex tax system,
uncertainty often arises even among
taxpayers who earnestly wish to follow the
law," and " '[i]t is not the purpose of the
law to penalizefrankdifference of opinion
or innocent errors made despite the
exercise of reasonable care.' " United
States v. Bishop. 412 U.S. 346. 360-361.
93 S.Ct. 2008.2017-2018.36 L.Ed.2d 941
(1973^ (quoting Spies v. United States. 317
U.S. 492.496.63 S.Ct. 364.367.87 L.Ed.
418X1943)).
FN9. In his opening and reply
briefs and at oral argument, Cheek
asserts that this case does not
present the issue whether a claim of

unconstitutionality would serve to
negate willfulness and that we need
not address the issue. Brief for
Petitioner 13; Reply Brief for
Petitioner 5, 11, 12; Tr. of Oral
Arg. 6,13. Cheek testified at trial,
however, that ff[i]t is my belief that
the law is being enforced
unconstitutionally." App. 60. He
also produced a letterfromcounsel
advising him that " 'Finally you
make a valid contention ... that
Congress1 power to tax comes from
Article L Section 8. Clause 1 of the
U.S. Constitution, and notfromthe
Sixteenth Amendment and that the
[latter], construed with Article I.
Section 2. Clause 3. never
authorized a tax on wages and
salaries, but only on gain and
profit.11 Id, at 57. We note also
that the jury asked for "the portion
[of the transcript] wherein Mr.
Cheek stated he was attempting to
test the constitutionality of the
income tax laws," Tr. 1704, and
that the trial judge later instructed
the jury that an opinion that the tax
laws violate a person's
constitutional rights does not
c o n s t i t u t e a good-faith
misunderstanding of the law. We
also note that at oral argument
Cheek's counsel observed that
"personal belief that a known
statute is unconstitutional smacks
of knowledge with existing law, but
disagreement with it." Tr. of Oral
Arg. 5. He also opined:
"If the person believes as a personal
belief that known—law known to
them [sic] is unconstitutional, I
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submit that that would not be a
defense, because what the person is
really saying is I know what the law
is, for constitutional reasons I have
made my own determination that it
is invalid. I am not suggesting that
that is a defense.
"However, if the person was told by
a lawyer or by an accountant
erroneously that the statute is
unconstitutional, and it's my
professional advice to you that you
don't have to follow it, then you
have got a little different situation.
This is not that case." Id, at 6.
Given this posture of the case, we
perceive no reason not to address
the significance of Cheek's
constitutional claims to the issue of
willfulness.
Claims that some of the provisions of the
tax code are unconstitutional are
submissions of a different order. [FN 10]
They do not arisefrominnocent mistakes
caused by the complexity of the Internal
Revenue Code. Rather, they reveal full
knowledge of the provisions at issue and a
studied conclusion, however wrong, that
those provisions are invalid **613 and
unenforceable. *206 Thus in this case,
Cheek paid his taxes for years, but after
attending various seminars and based on
his own study, he concluded that the
income tax laws could not constitutionally
require him to pay a tax.

FN10. In United States v. Murdoch.
290 U.S. 389. 54 S.Ct. 223. 78
L.Ed. 381 H933I discussed supra,

at 609-610, the defendant Murdock
was summoned to appear before a
revenue agent for examination.
Questions were put to him, which
he refused to answer for fear of
self-incrimination under state law.
He was indicted for refusing to
give testimony and supply
information contrary to the
pertinent provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code.
This Court
affirmed the reversal of Murdock's
conviction, holding that the trial
court erred in refusing to give an
instruction directing the jury to
consider Murdock's asserted claim
of a good-faith, actual belief that
because of the Fifth Amendment he
was privileged not to answer the
questions put to him. It is thus the
case that Murdock's asserted belief
was grounded in the Constitution,
but it was a claim of privilege not
to answer, not a claim that any
provision of the tax laws were
unconstitutional, and not a claim
for which the tax laws provided
procedures to entertain and resolve.
Cheek's position at trial, in
contrast, was that the tax laws were
unconstitutional as applied to him.
We do not believe that Congress
contemplated that such a taxpayer, without
risking criminal prosecution, could ignore
the duties imposed upon him by the
Internal Revenue Code and refuse to
utilize the mechanisms provided by
Congress to present his claims of invalidity
to the courts and to abide by their
decisions. There is no doubt that Cheek,
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from year to year, was free to pay the tax
that the law purported to require, file for a
refund and, if denied, present his claims of
invalidity, constitutional or otherwise, to
the courts. See 26 U.S.C. 6 7422. Also,
without paying the tax, he could have
challenged claims oftax deficiencies in the
Tax Court, § 6213, with the right to appeal
to a higher court if unsuccessful. §
7482(a)( 1). Cheek took neither course in
some years, and when he did was
unwilling to accept the outcome. As we
see it, he is in no position to claim that his
good-faith belief about the validity of the
Internal Revenue Code negates willfulness
or provides a defense to criminal
prosecution under ^ 7 2 0 1 and 7203. Of
course, Cheek was free in this very case to
present his claims of invalidity and have
them adjudicated, but like defendants in
criminal cases in other contexts, who
"willfully" refuse to comply with the
duties placed upon them by the law, he
must take the risk of being wrong.

Revenue Code should not be considered by
the jury in determining whether Cheek had
acted willfully .iFNJU

We thus hold that in a case like this, a
defendant's views about the validity of the
tax statutes are irrelevant to the issue of
willfulness and need not be heard by the
jury, and, if they are, an instruction to
disregard them would be proper. For this
purpose, it makes no difference whether
the claims of invalidity are frivolous or
have substance. It was therefore not error
in this case for the District Judge to
instruct the jury not to consider Cheeks
claims that the tax laws were
unconstitutional. However, it was error
for the court to instruct *207 the jury that
petitioner's asserted beliefs that wages are
not income and that he was not a taxpayer
within the meaning of the Internal

It is so ordered.

FN1L Cheek argues that applying
to him the Court of Appeals1
s t a n d a r d of
objective
reasonableness violates his rights
under the First, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments of the Constitution.
Since we have invalidated the
challenged standard on statutory
grounds, we need not address these
submissions.

IV
For the reasons set forth in the opinion
above, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is vacated, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

Justice SOUTER took no part in the
consideration or decision of this case.

Justice SCALIA. concurring in the
judgment.
I concur in the judgment of the Court
because our cases have consistently held
that the failure to pay a tax in the
good-faith belief that it is not legally
owing is not "willful" I do not join the
Court's opinion because I do not agree
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with the test for willfulness that it directs
the Court of Appeals to apply on remand.
As the Court acknowledges, our opinions
from the 1930's to the 1970's have
interpreted the word "willfully" in the
criminal tax statutes as requiring the "bad
purpose" or "evil motive" of
"intentionally] violating] a known legal
duty."
See, e.g., United States v.
Pomponio. 429 U.S. 10. 12. 97 S.Ct. 22.
23.50 L.Ed.2d 12(1976): United States v.
Murdoch. 290 U.S. 389.394-395.54 S.Ct.
223. 225-226. 78 L.Ed. 381 (1933V It
seems to me that today's opinion squarely
reverses that long-established statutory
construction **614 when it says that a
good-faith erroneous belief in the
unconstitutionality of a tax law is no
defense. It is quite impossible to say that
a statute which *208 one believes
unconstitutional represents a "known legal
duty."
See Marburv v. Madison. 1
Cranch 137. 177-178. 2 L.Ed. 60 (18031

rational basis for saying that a "willful"
violation is established by full knowledge
of a statutory requirement, but is not
established by full knowledge of a
requirement explicitly imposed by
regulation or order. Thus, today's opinion
works a revolution in past practice,
subjecting to criminal penalties taxpayers
who do not comply with Treasury
Regulations that are in their view contrary
to the Internal Revenue Code, Treasury
Rulings that are in their view contrary to
the regulations, and even IRS auditor
pronouncements that are in their view
contrary to Treasury Rulings. The law
already provides considerable incentive for
taxpayers to be careful in ignoring any
official assertion of tax liability, since it
contains civil penalties that apply even in
the event of a good-faith mistake, see, e.g.,
26 U.S.C. SS 6651. 6653. To impose in
addition criminal penalties for
misinterpretation of such a complex body
of law is a startling innovation indeed.

Although the facts of the present case
involve erroneous reliance upon the
Constitution in ignoring the otherwise
"known legal duty" imposed by the tax
statutes, the Court's new interpretation
applies also to erroneous reliance upon a
tax statute in ignoring the otherwise
"known legal duty" of a regulation, and to
erroneous reliance upon a regulation in
ignoring the otherwise "known legal duty"
of a tax assessment. These situations as
well meet the opinion's crucial test of
"reveal[ing] full knowledge of the
provisions at issue and a studied
conclusion, however wrong, that those
provisions are invalid and unenforceable,"
ante, at 612-613. There is, moreover, no

I find it impossible to understand how one
can derive from the lonesome word
"willfully" the proposition that belief in the
nonexistence of a textual prohibition
excuses liability, but belief in the invalidity
{i.e., the legal nonexistence) of a textual
prohibition does not. One may say, as the
law does *209 in many contexts, that
"willfully" refers to consciousness of the
act but not to consciousness that the act is
unlawful. See, e.g.. American Surety Co.
of New York v. Sullivan. 7 F.2d 605. 606
(CA2 1925^ (L. Hand, J.); cf. United
States v. International Minerals &
Chemical Corp.. 402 U.S. 558. 563-565.
91 S.Ct. 1697.1700-1702.29 L.Ed.2d 178
(1971). Or alternatively, one may say, as
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we have said until today with respect to the
tax statutes, that "willfully" refers to
consciousness of both the act and its
illegality. But it seems to me impossible to
say that the word refers to consciousness
that some legal text exists, without
consciousness that that legal text is
binding, i.e., with the good-faith beliefthat
it is not a valid law. Perhaps such a test
for criminal liability would make sense
(though in a field as complicated as federal
tax law, I doubt it), but some text other
than the mere word "willfully" would have
to be employed to describe it-and that text
is not ours to write.
Because today's opinion abandons clear
and longstanding precedent to impose
criminal liability where taxpayers have had
no reason to expect it, because the new
contours of criminal liability have no basis
in the statutory text, and because I strongly
suspect that those new contours make no
sense even as a policy matter, I concur
only in the judgment of the Court.

Justice BLACKMUN, with whom Justice
MARSHALL joins, dissenting.
It seems to me that we are concerned in
this case not with "the complexity of the
tax laws," ante, at 609, but with the
income tax law in its most elementary and
basic aspect: Is a wage earner a taxpayer
and are wages income?
The Court acknowledges that the
conclusively established standard for
willfulness under the applicable statutes is
the " Voluntary, **615 intentional

violation of a known legal duty.1" Ante, at
610. See United States v. Bishop. 412 U.S.
346.360,93 S.Ct. 2008.2017.36 L.Ed.2d
941 (1973V and United States v.
Pomponio. 429 U.S. 10. 12. 97 S.Ct. 22.
23.50L.Ed.2dl2n976V That being so,
it is incomprehensible to me how, in this
day, more than 70 years after the
institution of our *210 present federal
income tax system with the passage of the
Income Tax Act of 1913,3 8 Stat. 166, any
taxpayer of competent mentality can assert
as his defense to charges of statutory
willfulness the proposition that the wage
he receives for his labor is not income,
irrespective of a cult that says otherwise
and advises the gullible to resist income
tax collections. One might note in passing
that this particular taxpayer, after all, was
a licensed pilot for one of our major
commercial airlines; he presumably was a
person of at least minimum intellectual
competence.
The District Court's instruction that an
objectively reasonable and good-faith
misunderstanding of the law negates
willfulness lends further, rather than less,
protection to this defendant, for it adds an
additional hurdle for the prosecution to
overcome. Petitioner should be grateful
for this further protection, rather than be
opposed to it.
This Court's opinion today, I fear, will
encourage taxpayers to cling to frivolous
views of the law in the hope of convincing
a jury of their sincerity. If that ensues, I
suspect we have gone beyond the limits of
common sense.
While I may not agree with every word
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the Court of Appeals has enunciated in its
opinion, I would affirm its judgment in
this case. I therefore dissent.
END OF DOCUMENT
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ADDENDUM E

JURY INSTRUCTION
Turning now to the third element of this offense You are instructed that the government
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's failure to make a return was
willful Willfulness vs the voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty
This means that before you can convict the defendant of willful failure to file a 1995 state
tax return and evasion of a tax the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt that failure to
make a return was willful
The defendant's failure to make a return was willful if the law imposed a duty on
defendant to file a return he knew of this duty, and he voluntarily and intentionally
violated that duty
The defendant's conduct was not willful if he acted through negligence, inadvertence,
mistake, or due to a good faith misunderstanding of the law If the defendant had a
subjective good faith belief, no matter how unreasonable, that the law did not require him
to file tax returns, he did not act willfully However, if the defendant failed to make a return
either because he disagreed with the tax laws or he thought the tax laws to be
unconstitutional, these beliefs would not amount to a good faith misunderstanding of the
law so as to excuse his failure to make tax returns
The defendant's state of mind is something that you, the jury, must determine And there
is no way that the defendant's state of mind can be proved directly, because no one can
read another person's mind and tell what that person is thinking But the defendant's state
of mind can be proved indirectly from the surrounding circumstances This includes things
like what the defendant said, what the defendant did, how the defendant acted, and any
other facts or circumstances in evidence that show what was in the defendant's mind
The defendant acted willfully if he deliberately intended not to make his tax returns which
he knew ought to have been filed For the charge of willful failure to file tax returns for
1995 the government is not required to prove that the defendant had any intention to
defraud the government or to evade the payment of taxes The government must prove
only that it was the defendant's deliberate intention not to make tax returns which he knew
he was required to file, at the time that he was required by law to file them
The defendant acted willfully if he deliberately intended to defraud the government or to
evade the payment of taxes For the charge of evading the payment of taxes for 1995 the
government is required to prove that the defendant intended to defraud the government
or to evade the payment of taxes The government therefore, must prove that it was the
defendant's deliberate intention to defraud the government or to evade the payment of
taxes
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1

I

2

MR. FUJINO:

Judge, it's 5:00 o'clock, what's

the Court's inclination?

The only other matter I—I

° • wanted to address before the jury came in was the jury
*
5

instructions.
I

6
7

the back two and we want to address that.
I

8
9

We agreed on all of them except for, I think,

THE COURT:
MR. FUJINO:

Okay.

Let's do that right now.

But what do you want to do with

I the jury, Judge?

10

THE COURT:

Well, I think we may have to ask

11

the jurors, but they may want to just go through it and

1

finish it up today.

2

13
14

MR. FUJINO:
I

MR. SMITH:

1

5 I willfulness?

Okay.
What are we going to do about the

We've got cases, copies of the Cheeks case

16

and we need to determine what we're going to do with the

17

willfulness issue also.

"•8

motion that we were going—an instruction we were going

19

to hold in abeyance until we got—

20
21

THE COURT:

As that was—that was a — a

Is that what he's going to argue

right now—

22

MR. SMITH:

Right.

Oh.

23

THE COURT:

— t h e instructions?

24

MR. SMITH:

Okay.

25

MR. FUJINO:

And Judge, this is the Cheeks

194

' case, Counsel has also been provided with it.
*

Essentially, the instruction I'm thinking about

*

is, we were in chambers before talking about ignorance of

4

the law is not a defense unless A, B and C.

I think it

5 I may be the very back instruction or the second-to-last

6

instruction.

7

And what Cheeks indicates is it doesn't matter

8

if there's a — a grounded—well, let me get the language,

9 I whether or not misunderstanding is objectively
10

reasonable.

11
12
1

THE COURT:

MR. FUJINO:

17

I think (inaudible)

Yes.

I Instruction No. 36 is the proposed instruction.

15
16

Is that 35 you're looking at or is

I that--oh, 36?

3

14

And in this case,—

We're asking the Court to strike that simply
because Cheeks does not require that and as I understand
I Mr. Smith's argument, it doesn't matter whether or not

18

his law, his authority was legally, objectively—

19

objectively reasonable or not, it's just simply his

20

intent.

21

basis.

And we would ask the Court to strike on that

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. BAER:

Okay.
Well, Judge, and of course, the way

24

this trial has evolved and any time the Cheeks case, but

25

we're talking about the—you know, the—are we talking
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1

about the—which instruction are we talking about?

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. FUJINO:

4

MR. BAER:

5

MR. FUJINO:

6

I

MR. BAER:

36.
36.

And how does that read?
It—it's the statute.
The statute, well, let's—that's

7

what I thought, your Honor, and that goes as t o — I don't

8

think that Cheeks abrogates that.

9

I — I haven't heard any

I language to the effect that that is somehow—that—that

10

that somehow denies the viability or the legal basis of

11

the Utah state statute.

12

Cheeks, in any event, the Seventh Circuit—I

13

think it's dubious at best to take a Seventh Circuit case

14

and somehow say that that, you know, invalidates the Utah

15

state statute on the books.

16

to the State.

I—it seems a bit far flung

17

But it—was it an appeal to the Supreme Court?

18

MR. FUJINO:

19

MR. BAER:

20

MR. SMITH:

21

Which was?
The Cheeks?
Yes.

It was a Supreme Court

decision.

22

MR. BAER:

Supreme Court decision?

23 I

MS. MACANAS:

No.

24
25 I

MR. SMITH:

Yes.
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1

•

MS. MACANAS:

Cheeks was,

2

I

MR. BAER:

is?

3

•

MR. SMITH:

Yeah.

MR. BAER:

Cheeks.

4

It

5

I

MS. MACANAS:

6

I

MR. BAER:

But, y e a h —

Oh.

Okay.

W e l l , it i s — i t

i s , I'm

7

s o r r y , c e r t i o r a r i t o the United States Supreme C o u r t

3

w e n t from t h e S e v e n t h .

9 I

that

T h e h o l d i n g of Cheeks, as I have seen it b e f o r e

10

and I'm r e a d i n g t h i s from my note, apparently I h a d t h e s e

11

n o t e s a n d let m e just peruse it for just a m o m e n t ,

12

Honor.

13

your

T h e n o t e s I have are as follows and I g u e s s a t

14

t h i s m o m e n t , i t ' l l h a v e to stand as my u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f

15

t h e c a s e , I h a v e n ' t reviewed it recently; b u t m y n o t e s

16

reflect this:

17

t o e v a d e F e d e r a l income taxes and willfully f a i l i n g t o

1

f i l e Federal i n c o m e taxes, there is no requirement

8

In a prosecution for willfully

attempting

that

19

t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s g o o d faith belief must be o b j e c t i v e l y

20

reasonable.

21

o b j e c t i v e l y v e r s u s subjectively, if the claimed b e l i e f i s

22

t o b e c o n s i d e r e d p o s s i b l y negating the Federal

23

G o v e r n m e n t ' s e v i d e n c e purporting to show d e f e n d a n t ' s

24

a w a r e n e s s of a l e g a l duty at issue.

25

A n d I don't think we've been a r g u i n g

about

T h e y ' r e t a l k i n g about a federal g o v e r n m e n t ' s —
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the federal government but—and it's been melded enough
*

in this trial, I grant that.

°

the validity of State—of tax statutes are irrelevant to

4

the issue of willfulness and may not be heard by the jury

M

in a prosecution for willfulness, in quotes, attempting

®

to evade income taxes and willfully failing to file

7

income tax returns.

8

A defendant's view about

For these purposes, it makes no difference

9 J whether the claims of invalid—invalidity are frivolous
10

or have substance.

11

position, not to mention the statute, so we have a

12

different understanding of that case law and I still

13

don't see how it would negate a standing Utah state

14

statute.

15

issues but not—not precisely o n — o n this point.

16
17
18

And that seems to support the State's

It talks about—talks about maybe related

And without reading further, I don't know how
much of the facts are—are the same in that case.
MR. FUJINO:

Judge, the only thing I wanted to

19

add was, in terms of the objectable—objectively

20

reasonable standard.

21

pursuant to statute that h e — i t ' s only reasonable if he

22

relies on the judgment of an administrative law judge or

23

i can't remember the other provision of the statute,

24

that's objectively reasonable, that's the basis or the

25

standard through which the jurors are going to be guided.

If you have the requirement
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1

That's not required by Cheeks, it's not—it # s not

2

pursuant to somebody's lawful authority, it's not

3

pursuant to a correct interpretation; in fact, this

4

language from Cheeks, who is even broader, says no matter

5

how unreasonable—let me find the exact language.

6

Well, I — I can't find it.

I think it's on the

7

Court's copy.

8

no matter how incredible such misunderstandings and

9

beliefs are about the law may be.

10

But it says something to the effect that

And that's what we

I have t o — I mean, his beliefs may or may not be credible,

11

his beliefs may or may not be logical, but that doesn't

12

matter.

13

lawful authority of an administrative law judge or

14

whatever else that statute says.

1

5

It—It certainly should not be pursuant to the

MR. SMITH:

Your Honor, based on Cheek, every

16

Federal district in the United States has adopted a

17

willfulness jury instruction similar to the one that I

18

first proposed.

19

In the front end of Cheek, if you go to Page

20

192, it says held, starting at Paragraph 1.

21

misunderstanding of the law or a good faith belief that

22

one is not violating the law negates willfulness whether

23

or not the claimed belief or misunderstanding is

24

objectively reasonable.

25

Statutory willfulness which—
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A good faith

1
2

MS. MACANAS:
reading from?

3
4

Could we just know where you're

MR. SMITH:

I'm reading on Page 192 starting

with Paragraph 1.

5

MS. MACANAS:

6

MR. SMITH: Are you with me?

7

MS. MACANAS:

8
9

Thank you.

Where were you starting on Page

1?
MR. SMITH:

Starting with—with No. 1.

10

MS. MACANAS:

11

MR. SMITH:

12

THE COURT: No.

13

MS. MACANAS:

14

MR. BAER:

Thank you.
Should I start over?

Please.

Well, Judge, I would object. Those

15

are the headnotes, it's not the case. He's reading from

16

the headnotes of the case.

17

the headnotes of a case are not the case holding

18

necessarily.

19

It's fairly axiomatic that

It's a summary.

MR. SMITH:

Hang on just a minute. We'll find

20

it in the case then (inaudible)

21

THE COURT:

You know, if the jurors need to

22

make telephone calls, Mr. Marks, that they may be held

23

over, to call home that they're not going to be home, why

24

don't you make —have them make the phone calls right now

25

While they're arguing.
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1

2

3

^
5

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:

It's going to be at

least a couple hours, your Honor, right?
THE COURT:

Yeah.

Just in case.

(Inaudible discussion)
MR. BAER:

Judge, I will point to Page 192.

"

It # s talking about objective reasonable.

^

arguing objective versus subjective reasonable.

®

(inaudible) disagree with the court of appeals

We're not
That's

9 J requirement, a claimed good faith belief must be

10

objectively reasonable if considered as possibly negating

11

the government's evidence purporting to show the

12

defendant's aware of a legal duty, which we're not

13

arguing objectiveness versus subjectiveness.

14

MR. FUJINO:

(Inaudible)

And Judge, if that's not the

15

argument, then that statute or that jury instruction has

16

no application.

17

MR. BAER:

Well, if that's their new argument

18

your Honor, we could address that, but that hasn't been

19

raised to this point.

20

MR. SMITH:

The only issue I'm raising in

21

addition to what Mr. Fujino is raising is that I believe

22

I'm entitled to an instruction which defines intent and

23

instructs the jury that according to the instruction

24

(inaudible) proposed on willfulness that (inaudible)

25

THE COURT:

Let's see.
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Do you have a copy of

1

the one that you proposed?

2

MR* BAER:

I don't have it here,

Judge, I'd also draw your attention

3

to language further on down Page 192, that says it is not

4

contrary to common sense—just down Page—I'm sorry, I'm

*

sorry, it's Page 203. Where it's, we disagree

*

(inaudible) it says as follows, it is not contrary to

'

common sense let alone possible for a defendant to be

8

(inaudible) based on an irrational belief that he has no

9 I duty.
10
11

12

Forbidding his jury to consider evidence that

might negate willfulness would raise a serious question
of the (inaudible) jury trial provision.
We're not asking that the jury be forbidden to

13

consider this evidence.

If you want to fashion a jury

14

instruction that specifically instructs themi to—that

15

they may consider evidence that might negate willfulness,

16

the State would wholly support it, if something doesn't

17

already exist in that language in the draft so far.

18

May I approach?

19

THE COURT: Let's see, do you have a copy of

20

the defendant's willful versus voluntary, intentional

21

violation of known legal duty?

22

MR. BAER:

Judge, if I could draw your

23

attention to (inaudible) supports the State's position.

24

in this case, on Page 203, it says as follows:

25

therefore error to instruct the jury to disregard—
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It was

1

disregard evidence of the defendant's, and I'm saying the

^

defendant was Cheeks—

3

THE COURT: Where are you at now?

4

MR, BAER:

5

THE COURT: The bottom part?

6

MR. BAER:

7

Page 203.

Bottom part where it says, It was

therefore.

8

THE COURT: Okay.

9

MR. BAER:

I read to you from up above where it

10

says it would be proper to exclude evidence having no

11

relevance or probative value with respect to the

12

contrary, let alone impossible for defendant to be

13

ignorant of his duty based on an irrational belief. I

14

don't think we're there.

15

if you look down, it's—it was therefore error

16

to instruct the jury to disregard evidence of Cheeks'

17

understanding that within the meaning of the tax laws, he

18

was not a person required to file a return or pay income

19

taxes and that wages are not taxable income as incredible

20

as such misunderstandings or beliefs about the law might

21

be.

22

We're not asking that in this case# your Honor.

23

That is not happening in this case.

24

unreasonable the asserted beliefs or misunderstandings,

25

the more likely the jury will consider them to be nothing

203

Of course, the more

more than simple disagreement with known legal duties
2
3

4

imposed by tax laws and we'll find the government has
I carried its burden.

That's all we're asking in this

case.

5

Cheek asserted in the trial court that he

®

should be acquitted because he believed in good faith

7

that the income tax law is unconstitutional as applied to

8

him and thus could not be—legally impose any duty upon

9 I him of which he should have been aware.
10

Sounds similar

to the testimony we heard, not identical but similar.

11

Such submission is unsound, not because Cheeks'

12

unconstitutional arguments are not objectively reasonable

13

or frivolous, which they surely are # but because the

14

Murdock Pomp (inaudible) line of cases does not support

15

such a proposition.

16

willfulness requirement in the criminal provision of the

17

internal Revenue Code to require proof of knowledge of

18

the law.

19

Those cases construed the

This was because and they quote, our complex

20

tax system uncertainty often arises even among taxpayers

21

who earnestly wish to follow the law and it is not the

22

purpose of the law to penalize frank differences of

23

opinion or innocent errors made despite the exercise of

24

reasonable care.

25

If you wish to insert an instruction to that
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1

effect, the State has no objections.

2

purpose of the law to penalize frank differences of

3

opinion or innocent errors made despite the exercise of

4

I reasonable care.

It is not the

The State would have no objection to

that.
6

The case goes on:

Claims that some of the

7

provisions of the tax code are unconstitutional are

8

submissions of a totally different order. They do not

9 I arise from innocent mistakes caused by the complexity of
10

the Internal Revenue Code; rather, they reveal full

11

knowledge of the provisions at issue and a studied

12

J conclusion, however wrong that those provisions are

13 I invalid and unenforceable; thus, in this case, Cheek paid
14

his taxes for years, but after attending various seminars

1

5

and based upon his own study, he concluded the income tax

1

6

laws could not constitutionally require him to pay a tax,

17

Sounds remarkably similar, your Honor.

18

We do not believe that congress contemplated

19

such a taxpayer, without risking criminal prosecution,

20

could ignore the duties imposed upon him by the Internal

21

Revenue Code and refuse to utilize the mechanisms

22

provided by congress to present his claims of invalidity

23

to the courts and to abide by their decision.

24
25

There is no doubt that Cheek from year to year
was free to pay the tax that the law purported to

205

1

require, file for refund and if denied, present his
claims of invalidity, constitutional or otherwise, to the

I courts.

And it cites a United States Code section, as

you can see.
5

Also, without paying the tax, he could have

*

challenged the claims of deficiencies in the tax court.

M

We've heard evidence that it didn't appear, that's with

8

the State Tax Court, of course, with a right to appeal to

9 J a higher court if necessary—if unsuccessful.
10

I'm sorry.

Cheek took neither courses for some years and

11

when he did, was unwilling to accept the outcome.

12

see, he is in no position to claim that his good faith

13

belief about the validity of the Internal Revenue Code

As we

14 I negates willfulness or provides a defense to criminal
15
1

6

I prosecution under the Sections 7-201 and 7-203
of course, Cheek was free in this very case to

17

present his claims of invalidity, as has been done in

1

8

this case, your Honor, and had been adjudicated; but like

1

9

defendants in criminal cases in other contexts who,

20

guote, "willfully", close quote, refuse to comply with

21

the duties placed upon them by law, he must take the risk

22

of being wrong.

23

And here's the holding:

We thus hold that in a

24

case like this, a defendant's views about the validity of

25

a tax statute are irrelevant to the issue of willfulness.
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Perhaps we should have an instruction to that effect,
please, and need not be heard by the jury and if they
are, an instruction to disregard them would be proper.
The State would move for such an instruction.
For this purpose, it makes no difference
whether the claim of invalidity are—are frivolous or
have substance.

It was therefore not error in this case

for the district court to instruct the jury not to
consider Cheek's claim that the tax laws were
unconstitutional; however, it was error for them to
instruct the jury that petitioner's asserted beliefs that
wages are not income and that he was not a taxpayer
within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code should
not be considered by the jury in determining whether
Cheek had acted willfully.
I know of no such instructions in our list and
I still am at a loss to see how that reverts back to the
State statute.

I would renew the motion for additional

instructions that indicate that under United States law,
a defendant's views about the validity of the tax
divisions are irrelevant to the issue of willfulness and
need not be heard by you, the members of the jury, and if
they are—well, then you don't need—they are an
instruction to disregard, that is an instruction and
should be—and should be disregarded.
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We would

appreciate under this very holding that inserted
instruction.
MR. FUJINO:

Judge, I need to respond briefly.

What's stated here in Cheeks is obviously different from
the context of the other constitutional arguments and the
arguments that may have been presented in Cheeks and it
still does not preclude the arguments that we've stated;
in fact# it's still consistent with the arguments. That
jury instruction, No. 36, I believe# should be
eliminated.
Keep in mind, they're—they're differentiating
the differences in the instructions.

One concerns that

wages are not income, that he was not a taxpayer. And
the trial court there instructed the jury that—something
about it has to be based on objective reasonableness.
And that's still our argument there.
The Supreme Court instructed the lower courts
that that was error to do so on that basis.

This other

argument is different from—from the objective
reasonableness determination that we've been talking
about.
MR. BAER:

Judge, I may have missed one point.

We're not figuring in any fashion, regardless of what you
do with the instruction that's included in that and been
agreed to previously—well, the subject (inaudible) that
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it's going to in fact be substituted for some other
instruction (inaudible) so that's clear.
And again, we would renew our motion to have an
instruction that comports with the language directly out
of Cheek.
THE COURT:

Just listening to each of your

arguments and reading the Instruction No. 36, the Court
is of the opinion that Instruction No. 36 should remain
and defendant's motion is denied at this time. And
State's motion to add the additional motion is denied
also at this time.
MR. FUJINO:

Janise, were there any other

instructions?
MS. MACANAS:

We can take a look at them

(inaudible)
THE COURT:
MR. BAER:

Is that yours?
W e — I don't believe we've agreed to

No. 35.
THE COURT:
MR. BAER:
THE COURT:
MR. BAER:
that.

Is there anything else?
No. 35, Judge.
No. 35.
I don't believe we've agreed to

I don't know of any authority on it.
MR. SMITH:

I believe we did agree to that one

and you put it in your file.
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ADDENDUM G

FILED DISTRICT COUBT
Third Judicial District
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
IN AMD FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE*

THE STATE OF UTAH,

t

Plaintiff,
VS.
THOMAS H. SMITH,

:

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY

:

CRIMINAL NO. 991920225

:

Defendant .
INSTRUCTION NO. 1
You are instructed that the defendant THOMAS H. SMITH

is

charged by the Amended Information which has been duly filed with
the

commission

RETURN

and

TAX

Of

TAX EVASION-FAILING TO RENDER A PROPER TAX
EVASION-WILLFUL

EVASION

OF

INCOME

TAX.

The

Information a l l e g e s :
COUNT I

TAX EVASION - FAILING TO RENDER A PROPER TAX RETURN, a Third
Degree Felony, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or before
April 15, 1996 in violation of Title 76, Chapter 8, Section
1101(1) (b), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that THOMAS
SMITH, with an intent to evade any tax or requirement of Title 59
or any lawful requirement of the State Tax Commission, failed to
make, render, sign, or verify any return or to supply any
information within the time required under this title, or did make,
render, sign, verify any false or fraudulent return or statement,
or supplied false or fraudulent information; for tax year 1995.
COUNT II
TAX EVASION - WILLFUL EVASION OF INCOME TAX, a Second Degree
Felony, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or before April 15,
1996 in violation of Title 76, Chapter 8, Section 1101(1) (c), Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that THOMAS H. SMITH,
willfully attempted to evade or defeat a tax or the payment thereof
due on his income earned in 1995.

INSTRUCTION NO.

2

Instruction No. 1 is not to be considered by you as a
statement of the facts proved in this case, but is to be regarded
by you merely as a summarized statement of the allegations of the
Amended Information.

The mere fact that the defendant stands

charged with an offense is not to be taken by you as any evidence
of his guilt.

INSTRUCTION NO.

You

are

instructed

3

that to the Amended

Information

the

defendant has entered a plea of not guilty. The plea of not guilty
denies each of the essential allegations of the charge contained in
the Information and casts upon the State the burden of proving each
and all of the essential allegations thereof to your satisfaction
and beyond a reasonable doubt.

INSTRUCTION NO.

4

You are instructed that the mere fact that the defendant has
been charged with an offense and has been held to answer to the
charge by a committing magistrate is not any evidence of his guilt
and is not even a circumstance which should be considered by you in
determining his guilt or innocence.

INSTRUCTION NO.

5~

I t becomes my duty as j u d g e to i n s t r u c t you c o n c e r n i n g
law a p p l i c a b l e

t o t h i s c a s e , and i t i s your d u t y a s j u r o r s

the
to

f o l l o w t h e law a s I s h a l l s t a t e i t to you.
The f u n c t i o n of the j u r y i s to t r y t h e i s s u e s of f a c t
a r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e a l l e g a t i o n s i n t h e I n f o r m a t i o n
c o u r t and t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s p l e a of "not g u i l t y ' 1 .

that

f i l e d in

this

T h i s duty you

s h o u l d p e r f o r m u n i n f l u e n c e d by p i t y f o r t h e d e f e n d a n t o r by p a s s i o
o r p r e j u d i c e a g a i n s t him.
biased against

You must not s u f f e r

yourselves

t h e defendant because of t h e f a c t

a r r e s t e d for t h i s o f f e n s e ,

t h a t he has b e e n

or because an I n f o r m a t i o n has been

a g a i n s t him, o r b e c a u s e he has been b r o u g h t b e f o r e
stand t r i a l .

to be

the court

None of t h e s e f a c t s i s e v i d e n c e of h i s g u i l t ,

to
and y e t

a r e n o t p e r m i t t e d t o i n f e r or t o s p e c u l a t e from any o r a l l of
t h a t he i s more l i k e l y to be g u i l t y than

t r i a l and t h e law as s t a t e d to you by me.

you t o be g o v e r n e d by mere s e n t i m e n t ,
prejudice,

them

innocent.

You a r e t o be governed s o l e l y by t h e e v i d e n c e i n t r o d u c e d
this

file

The law

conjecture,

p u b l i c o p i n i o n or p u b l i c f e e l i n g .

in

forbids

sympathy,

passior.

Both t h e S t a t e of

Utah and t h e d e f e n d a n t have a r i g h t to demand and t h e y do demand and
e x p e c t t h a t you w i l l c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y and d i s p a s s i o n a t e l y
and weigh t h e e v i d e n c e and apply the law of t h e c a s e ,

consider

c h a t you w i l l

r e a c h a j u s t v e r d i c t r e g a r d l e s s of what t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of such
v e r d i c t may b e .
of e a c h

juror.

The v e r d i c t must e x p r e s s t h e i n d i v i d u a l

opinion

INSTRUCTION NO.

(^

At times throughout the trial the court has been called
upon to determine whether certain offered evidence might properly be admitted.

You are not to be concerned with the reasons

for such rulings and are not to draw any inferences from them.
Whether offered evidence is admissible is purely a question
of law.

In admitting evidence to which an objection is made,

the court does not determine what weight should be given such
evidence; nor does it pass on the credibility of the witness.
You are not to consider evidence offered but not admitted, nor
any evidence stricken out by the court; as to any question to
which an objection was sustained, you must not conjecture as to
what the answer might have been or as to the reason for the
objection.

INSTRUCTION NO.

' J

All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in
favor of innocence, and a defendant is presumed innocent until he
is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

And in case of a

reasonable doubt as to whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown,
he is entitled to an acquittal.
I have heretofore told you that the burden is upon the State
to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Proof

beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof to an absolute
certainty.

Now by reasonable doubt is meant a doubt that is

based on reason and one which is reasonable in view of all the
evidence.

It must be a reasonable doubt and not a doubt which is

merely fanciful or imaginary or based on a wholly speculative
possibility.

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of

proof which satisfies the mind, convinces the understanding of
those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it and obviates
all reasonable doubt.

A reasonable doubt is a doubt which

reasonable men and women would entertain, and it must arise from
the evidence or the lack of the evidence in this case.

INSTRUCTION NO.

£_

Where t h e r e i s a c o n f l i c t in the evidence you s h o u l d
r e c o n c i l e such c o n f l i c t

as f a r as you r e a s o n a b l y c a n .

But

where t h e c o n f l i c t c a n n o t be r e c o n c i l e d , you a r e t h e

final

j u d g e s and must d e t e r m i n e from the evidence what t h e

facts

are.

There a r e no d e f i n i t e r u l e s governing how you s h a l l

d e t e r m i n e t h e w e i g h t o r convincing force of any e v i d e n c e ,

or

how you s h a l l d e t e r m i n e what the f a c t s in t h i s c a s e a r e .

But

you s h o u l d c a r e f u l l y

and c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y c o n s i d e r and compare

a l l of t h e t e s t i m o n y ,

and a l l of the f a c t s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,

w h i c h have a b e a r i n g on any i s s u e , and determine
w h a t the f a c t s a r e .

therefrom

You a r e not bound to b e l i e v e a l l

t h e w i t n e s s e s have t e s t i f i e d

that

to or any w i t n e s s o r c l a s s of

w i t n e s s e s u n l e s s such t e s t i m o n y i s r e a s o n a b l e and c o n v i n c i n g
i n view of a l l of t h e f a c t s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s in e v i d e n c e .
You may b e l i e v e one w i t n e s s as a g a i n s t many, or many as

against

a fewer number i n a c c o r d a n c e with your h o n e s t c o n v i c t i o n s .

The

t e s t i m o n y of a w i t n e s s known to have made f a l s e s t a t e m e n t s

on

o n e m a t t e r i s n a t u r a l l y l e s s convincing on o t h e r m a t t e r s .

So

if

to

you b e l i e v e a w i t n e s s h a s w i l f u l l y t e s t i f i e d f a l s e l y a s

any m a t e r i a l f a c t i n t h i s c a s e , you may d i s r e g a r d t h e whole o f
t h e t e s t i m o n y of such w i t n e s s , or you may g i v e i t such w e i g h t
a s you t h i n k i t i s e n t i t l e d

to.

INSTRUCTION NO.

~\

You are the e x c l u s i v e judges of the c r e d i b i l i t y of the
w i t n e s s e s and the weight of the evidence.

In judging the weight

of the testimony and c r e d i b i l i t y of the witnesses you have a
r i g h t to t a k e i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e i r b i a s , t h e i r i n t e r e s t

in

the r e s u l t of the s u i t , or any probable motive or lack t h e r e o f
to t e s t i f y f a i r l y ,

i f any i s shown.

You may consider the w i t -

n e s s e s 1 deportment upon the witness stand, the r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of
t h e i r s t a t e m e n t s , t h e i r apparent frankness or candor, or the want
of i t ,

t h e i r o p p o r t u n i t y to know, t h e i r a b i l i t y to u n d e r s t a n d ,

and t h e i r c a p a c i t y to remember.

You should consider t h e s e m a t t e r s

t o g e t h e r w i t h a l l of the other facts and circumstances which you
may b e l i e v e have a b e a r i n g on the t r u t h f u l n e s s or accuracy of the
witnesses

f

statement.

INSTRUCTION NO.

\ Q

You are instructed that the defendant is a competent
witness in his own behalf and his testimony should be received and given the same consideration as you give to that
of any other witness.

The fact that he stands accused of a

crime is no evidence of his guilt and is no reason for rejecting his testimony.

However, you should weigh his testimony

the same as you weigh the testimony of any other witness.

INSTRUCTION NO.

U

In determining any fact in this case you should not
consider nor be influenced by any statement made or act done
by the court which you may interpret as indicating its views
thereon. You are the sole and final judges of all questions
of fact submitted to you, and you must determine such questions
for yourselves from the evidence, without regard to what you
believe the court thinks thereon.

The court has not intended

to express, or intimate, or be understood as giving any opinion on what the proof shows or does not show, or what are or
what are not the facts in the case.
the court thinks thereon.

And it is immaterial what

You must follow your own views and

not be influenced by the views of the court.

INSTRUCTION NO.

\ 1

The S t a t e of Utah and the defendant both are e n t i t l e d
to the i n d i v i d u a l opinion of each j u r o r .

I t i s the duty of

each of you a f t e r considering a l l the evidence in the case,

to

d e t e r m i n e , if p o s s i b l e , the question of g u i l t or innocence of
the defendant.

When you have reached a conclusion in t h a t r e -

s p e c t , you should not change i t merely because one or more or
a l l of your fellow j u r o r s may have come to a d i f f e r e n t
clusion.

con-

However, each j u r o r should freely and f a i r l y d i s c u s s

w i t h h i s fellow j u r o r s the evidence and the deduction to be
drawn therefrom.

If,

a f t e r doing so, any j u r o r should be s a t -

i s f i e d t h a t a conclusion f i r s t reached by him was wrong, he
u n h e s i t a t i n g l y should abandon t h a t o r i g i n a l opinion and render
h i s v e r d i c t according to h i s f i n a l

decision.

INSTRUCTION NO.

• ±

I f i n t h e s e i n s t r u c t i o n s any r u l e , d i r e c t i o n or i d e a
h a s been s t a t e d i n v a r y i n g ways, no emphasis t h e r e o n i s
t e n d e d , and none must be i n f e r r e d by you.

in-

For t h a t r e a s o n ,

you a r e n o t to s i n g l e o u t any c e r t a i n s e n t e n c e , or any i n d i v i d u a l
p o i n t o r i n s t r u c t i o n , and i g n o r e the o t h e r s , but you a r e t o c o n s i d e r a l l the i n s t r u c t i o n s a s a whole, and t o r e g a r d each i n
l i g h t of a l l t h e o t h e r s .
The o r d e r i n which t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s a r e given has no
s i g n i f i c a n c e as to t h e i r r e l a t i v e

importance.

the

INSTRUCTION NO.

^

The attitude and conduct of jurors at the outset of
their deliberations are a matter of considerable importance.
It is rarely productive of good for a juror, upon entering
the jury room, to make an emphatic expression of his opinion
on the case or to announce a determination to stand for a
certain verdict.

When one does that at the outset, his sense

of pride nay be aroused, and he may hesitate to recede from
an announced position if shown that it is fallacious.

Remember

that you are not partisans or advocates in this matter, but are
judges.

The final test of the quality of your service will lie

in the verdict which you return to the court, not in the opinions any of you may hold as you retire.

Have in mind that you

will make a definite contribution to efficient judicial administration if you arrive at a just and proper verdict.

To that

end, the court would remind you that in your deliberations in
the jury rocn there can be no triumph excepting the ascertainment
and declaration of the truth and the administation of justice
based therecn.

INSTRUCTION NO.

\^>

The court has endeavored to give you instructions embodying all rules of law that may become necessary in guiding
you to a just and lawful verdict.

The applicability of some of

these instructions will depend upon the conclusions you reach
as to what the facts are. As to any such instruction, the
fact that it has been given must not be taken as indicating an
opinion of the court and that the instruction will be necessary
or as to what the facts are.

If an instruction applies only to

a state of facts which you find does not exist, you will disregard the instruction.

INSTRUCTION NO .

\ IP

Two classes of evidence are recognized and admitted in
courts of justice, upon either or both of which, juries lawfully may base their findings, whether favorable to the State
or to the defendant, provided, however, that to support a verdict of guilt the evidence, whether of one kind or the other
or a combination of both, must carry the convincing quality required by law.
One type of evidence is known as direct and the other
as circumstantial.

The law makes no distinction between the two

classes as to the degree of proof required for conviction or as
to their effectiveness in defendant's favor, but respects each
for such convincing force as it may carry and accepts each as a
reasonable method of proof.
Direct evidence of a person's conduct at any time in
question consists of the testimony of every witness who, with
any of his own physical senses, perceived such conduct or any
part thereof, and which testimony describes or relates what
thus was perceived.

All other evidence admitted in the trial is

circumstantial in relation to such conduct, and, insofar as it
shows any act, statement or other conduct, or any circumstance
of fact, tending to prove by reasonable inference the innocence
or guilt of the defendant, it may be considered by you in arriving at a verdict.

INSTRUCTION NO.

\H

Taxable year means the time period January 1, 1995, up to and
including December 31, 1995.

INSTRUCTION NO.

\¥

A Utah Resident is defined as an individual who:
(a) is domiciled for the entire year in Utah even though temporarily outside of Utah; or,
(b) an individual who is domiciled in this state for any period of time during the taxable year, but
only for the duration of such period; or,
(b) even though living outside Utah, maintains a permanent place of abode within the state and
spends a total of 183 days or more of the taxable year within Utah.

INSTRUCTION MO,

Under

Title

\°V

59 of the Utah Code, "taxpayer11 means any

individual, estate, or trust or beneficiary of an estate or trust,
whose income is subject in whole or part to the tax imposed by
this, Individual Income Tax Act, chapter.

INSTRUCTION NO._J£0

Under Title 59. "taxable income" and "state taxable income" for resident individuals are
fined as provided in Sections 59-10-111 and 59-10-112.
Under 59-10-111, "Federal taxable income" means taxable income as currently defined in
:tion 63, Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
Under 59-10-112, "State taxable income" in the case of a resident individual means his
eral taxable income (as defined by Section 59-10-111) with any applicable modifications,
tractions, and adjustments.

INSTRUCTION MO.

Sec. 61. Gross income defined
(a) General definition
Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross
income means all income from whatever source derived,
including (but not limited to) the following items:
(1) Compensation
for
services,
including
fees,
commissions, fringe benefits, and similar items;
(2) Gross income derived from business;
(3) Gains derived from dealings in property;
(4) Interest;
(5) Rents;
(6) Royalties;
(7) Dividends;
(8) Alimony and separate maintenance payments;
(9) Annuities;
(10) Income from l i f e insurance and endowment c o n t r a c t s ;
(11) Pensions;
(12) Income from discharge of indebtedness;
(13) Distributive share of partnership gross income;
(14) Income in respect of a decedent; and
(15) Income from an interest in an estate or trust.

INSTRUCTION NO,

gQ

In U.S. Code, Sec. 63. Taxable income is defined as:
(a)

In general
Except as provided in subsection (b) , for purposes of
this subtitle, the term "taxable income" means gross income minus
the deductions allowed by this chapter (other than the standard
deduction).
(b) Individuals who do not itemize their deductions
In the case of an individual who does not elect to
itemize his deductions for the taxable year, for purposes of this
subtitle, the term "taxable income11 means adjusted gross income,
minus:
(1) the standard deduction, and
(2) the deduction for personal exemptions provided in
section 151.

INSTRUCTION HO.

^3>

Federal Law at 26 CFR Sec. 1.861-8 states computation o
taxable income from sources within the United States.

The rules

contained in this section apply in determining taxable income of
the taxpayer from sources from within the United States.

INSTRUCTION NO.

Federal

law

says

for purposes of

this

"exempt income" means any income that i s

section,

the

i n whole or i n

term
part,

exempt, excluded, or eliminated for federal income t a x p u r p o s e s .

INSTRUCTION NO._^C*

Under Title 59, section 59-10-502 lists the persons required tofiletax returns. That
:tion states: An income tax return with respect to the tax imposed by this chapter shall be filed
every resident individual, estate, or trust required tofilea federal income tax return for the
able year.

INSTRUCTION MO,

O"1

Utah Code Ann., Section 59-10-102, entitled MDeclaration
Intent,11 states as follows:
The intent of the Legislature in the enactment of this
chapter is to accomplish the following objectives:
(1) to impose on each resident individual, estate, or
trust for each taxable year a tax measured by the amount
of his "taxable incomew for such year, as determined for
federal income tax purposes, subject to certain
adjustments; and
(2) to impose on each nonresident individual, estate, or
trust for each taxable year a tax measured by the amount
allocable to this state of his "taxable income" for such
year, as determined for federal income tax purposes,
subject to certain adjustments; and
(3) to adopt for Utah individual income tax purposes, by
reference, the provisions of the federal income tax laws
which are applicable in arriving at the amount of income
subject to tax for federal income tax purposes which, it
is believed, will:
(a) promote consistency in tax treatment of
persons required to file returns of income for
both federal individual income tax and Utah
individual income tax purposes; and
(b) enable a taxpayer to prepare his required
Utah income tax return for any taxable year
with a minimum expenditure of additional time
and effort after having prepared his federal
income tax return for such year;
(4) to conform, to the extent practicable, certain of the
existing rules of procedure under and for the
administration of the Utah individual income tax law to
corresponding or apposite rules of administration and
procedure prescribed by the federal income tax laws, with
a view to reduction of duplication of effort, promotion
of better understanding of requirements, and greater
consistency between state and federal procedures and
administration.
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Utah Code, Section 76-2-103, states:
A person engages in conduct:
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with
respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of
his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire
to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his
conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when
he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing
circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when
he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to
cause the result.
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of
his conduct when he is aware of but consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk
must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care
that an ordinary person would exercise under all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor1 s standpoint.
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent
with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or
the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances
exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such
a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care
that an ordinary person would exercise in all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
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The defendant has introduced evidence of advice he heard given by speakers at
meetings, tape recorded lectures, essays, pamphlets, court opinions, and other material
that he testified he relied on in concluding that he was not a person required to file an
income tax return for 1995. This evidence has been admitted solely for the purpose of
aiding you in determining whether or not the defendant's failure to timely file a tax return
for 1995 was knowing and willful and you should not consider it for any other purpose.
You are not to consider this evidence as containing any law that you are to apply in
reaching your verdicts, because all of the law applicable to this case is set forth in these
instructions.
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You are instructed that the admission of defendant's
Exhibit #23 A-W is not entered into evidence for any substantive
value but for the limited purpose of showing the defendant's
state of mind on or about January 1, 1995 to April 16, 1996.
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A separate crime or offense is charged in each count of the Amended Information. Each
charge and the evidence pertaining to it should be considered separately. The fact that you may
find the defendant guilty or not guilty as to one of the charged offenses should not affect your
verdict as to any other charged offense.
I caution you, members of the jury, that you are here to determine from the evidence in
this case whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty. The defendant is on trial only for those
specific offenses alleged in the information.
Also, the question of punishment should never be considered by the jury in any way in
deciding the case. If the defendant is convicted the matter of punishment is for the judge to
determine.
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A separate crime is charged in each count. You must decide each count separately. Your
verdict on one count should not control your verdict on any other count.

Failure to Make,

Render, Sign, or Verify a Proper Tax Return is a separate charge from Willful Evasion of Taxes.
Each charge should be considered separately, even if they are for the same year.
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Before you can convict the defendant, Thomas Smith, of Tax
Evasion - Failure to Make, Render, Sign or Verify a Tax Return, in
Count I of the Amended Information, you must find from the evidence
that the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt each and every
one of the following elements:
1.

On or before April 15, 1996, in Salt Lake County, State

of Utah, Thomas Smith;
2.

Intentionally or willfully evaded;

3«

Any applicable tax or requirement of Title 59; and that

4.

Failed to make, render, sign, or verify any return or to

he

supply any information within the time required, or he made,
rendered, signed, or verified any false or fraudulent return of
statement, or he supplied any false or fraudulent information.
If the evidence fails to establish beyond a reasonable doubt
all of the elements of Tax Evasion - Failure to Hake, Render, Sign
or Verify a Tax Return, in Count I of the Amended Information, you
must find the defendant not guilty.

On the other hand, if the

evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements
of Tax Evasion - Failure to Make, Render, Sign or Verify a Tax
Return, you must find the defendant guilty of the offense.
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Before you can convict the defendant, Thomas Smith, of Tax
Evasion - Willful Evasion of Income Tax, in Count II of the Amended
Information, you must find from the evidence that the State has
proven beyond

a reasonable doubt each and every one of the

following elements:
1.

On or before April 15, 1996, in Salt Lake County, State

of Utah, Thomas Smith;
2.

Intentionally or willfully attempted;

3.

To evade or defeat any applicable tax or requirement of

Title 59 or the payment thereof due on his income earned in 1995.
If the evidence fails to establish beyond a reasonable doubt
all of the elements of Tax Evasion - Willful Evasion of Income Tax,
in Count II of the Amended Information, you must find the defendant
not guilty.

On the other hand, if the evidence establishes beyond

a reasonable doubt all of the elements of Tax Evasion - Willful
Evasion of Income Tax, you must find the defendant guilty of the
offense.
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When you retire to consider your verdict, you will select one
of your members to act as foreperson, who, as foreperson, will
preside over your deliberations.
Your verdicts in this case must be either:
Guilty of TAX EVASION-FAILING TO RENDER A PROPER TAX RETURN,
a Third Degree Felony, as charged in Count I of the
Information;
or
Not Guilty of Count I, TAX EVASION-FAILING TO RENDER A PROPER
TAX RETURN, a Third Degree Felony;
And/or
Guilty of TAX EVAS ION-WILLFUL EVASION OF INCOME TAX, a Second
Degree Felony, as charged in Count II of the Information;
or
Not Guilty of Count II, TAX EVASION-WILLFUL EVASION OF INCOME
TAX, a Second Degree Felony;
as your deliberations may determine.
This being a criminal case, a unanimous concurrence of all
jurors is required to find a verdict.
writing, and when found, must be

Your verdict must be in

signed

and

dated

foreperson and then returned by you to this court.

by your
When your

verdicts have been found, notify the bailiff that you are
report to the court.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah
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